Browsing by Author "Stenbacka, Rune"

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  • Koskela, Erkki; Stenbacka, Rune (2000)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 12/2000
    We address the question of how lending market competition, measured by the bargaining power of banks, affects the agency costs of debt finance.It is shown that intensified lending market competition will lead to lower lending rates and investment return distributions which are shifted towards lower, but less risky returns.Consequently, it follows that increased lending market competition will reduce the agency cost of debt financing.Hence, our analysis does not lend support to the commonly held view that there would be a trade-off between more intensive lending market competition and higher agency costs of debt finance.
  • Koskela, Erkki; Stenbacka, Rune (2000)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 16/2000
    We offer a unified framework to analyze the determination of employment, employee effort, wages, profit sharing and capital structure when firms face stochastic revenue shocks.We apply a generalized Nash bargaining solution, which extends the wage bargaining literature by incorporating efficiency wage considerations, profit sharing and capital structure.The profit sharing instrument is demonstrated to have positive effort-augmenting and wage-moderating effects, which exactly offset the negative dilution effect in equilibrium.Leverage is shown to reduce employment and to have a strategic commitment value as a wage-moderating mechanism for firms facing unions in bilateral wage negotiations.Finally, some implications for equilibrium unemployment are discussed.Key words: wage bargaining, profit sharing, capital structure, employment
  • Kauppi, Heikki; Koskela, Erkki; Stenbacka, Rune (2004)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 11/2004
    The study looks at the implications of product market competition and investment for price setting, wage bargaining and thereby for equilibrium unemployment in an economy with product and labour market imperfections.We show that intensified product market competition will reduce equilibrium unemployment, whereas the effect of increased capital intensity is more complex.Higher capital intensity will decrease the equilibrium unemployment when the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is less than one, while the reverse happens when this elasticity is higher than one, but smaller than the elasticity of substitution between products.Finally, we demonstrate how labour and product market imperfections, characterised by the wage and price setting mark-ups, affect the optimal capital stock.Our findings raise important questions for future empirical research.Key words: equilibrium unemployment, product market imperfections, investment, wage bargaining JEL classification numbers: E22, E24, J51, L11
  • Koskela, Erkki; Stenbacka, Rune (2003)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 19/2003
    We study employment, employee effort, wages and profit sharing when firms face stochastic revenue shocks and when base wages and profit shares are determined through collective bargaining.The negotiated profit share depends positively on the relative bargaining power of the trade union and has effort-enhancing and wage-moderating effects.We show that higher profit sharing reduces equilibrium unemployment under circumstances with sufficiently rigid labour market institutions, ie sufficiently high benefit- replacement ratios and relative bargaining powers of trade unions.Conversely, profit sharing seems to be destructive from the point of view of employment when the labour market rigidities are sufficiently small. Key words: wage bargaining, profit sharing, efficiency wages, equilibrium unemployment JEL classification numbers: J51, J41, G32
  • Koskela, Erkki; Stenbacka, Rune (2001)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 5/2001
    We study the role of labour and credit market imperfections for the determination of equilibrium unemployment.In the credit market loan contracts are negotiated between financiers and firms, both possessing bargaining power, while the firms and organized labour bargain over the base wage.The sequential labour and credit market negotiations are assumed to take place conditional on the firm having committed itself to use performance related profit sharing in addition to the negotiated base wage.It is shown that in the presence of profit sharing intensified credit market competition will raise equilibrium unemployment, because it induces wage-enhancing effects causing an increase in the outside option available to union members.Equilibrium unemployment is also an increasing function of firms' bankruptcy risks.It is, however, independent of the degree credit market imperfections if the compensation system is unrelated to firms' profits or if there is a monopoly union in the labour market.Keywords: wage and loan bargaining, compensation systems, equilibrium unemployment.
  • Shy, Oz; Stenbacka, Rune (1998)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 22/1998
    This study demonstrates that the common view, whereby an increase in competition leads banks to increased risk taking, fails to hold in an environment where consumers can choose in which bank to make a deposit based on their knowledge of the riskiness incorporated in the banks' outstanding loan portfolios.We show that, in the absence of deposit insurance, competition between differentiated banks will increase the returns from diversification.We offer a welfare analysis establishing that introduction of competition into the banking industry can only improve social welfare.However, competition cannot always guarantee that diversification will occur to a socially optimal extent.Finally, we show that deposit insurance would eliminate the beneficial effects of banks competing with asset quality as a strategic instrument. Keywords: Risk taking in banking, banks' portfolio diversification, bank competition, deposit insurance
  • Stenbacka, Rune; Takalo, Tuomas (2019)
    Journal of Financial Stability April
    Published in Bank of Finland Discussion Paper 2/2016 http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:bof-201603021033
    We establish that the effect of intensified deposit market competition, measured by reduced switching costs, on the probability of bank failures depends critically on whether we focus on competition with established customer relationships or competition for the formation of such relationships. With inherited customer relationships, intensified competition due to lower switching costs destabilizes the banking market, whereas it stabilizes the market if we focus on competition for the formation of customer relationships. We characterize the factors important for evaluating the effects of intensified competition on stability in a market with unattached as well as locked-in depositors.
  • Stenbacka, Rune; Takalo, Tuomas (2016)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 2/2016
    Published in Journal of Financial Stability 41 ; April ; 2019 ; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2018.12.001
    We establish that the effect of intensified deposit market competition, measured by reduced switching costs, on the probability of bank failures depends critically on whether we focus on competition with established customer relationships or competition for the formation of such relationships. With inherited customer relationships, intensified competition (i.e., lower switching costs) destabilizes the banking market, whereas it stabilizes the banking market if we shift our focus to competition for the formation of customer relationships. These findings imply that the proportion between new and locked-in depositors is decisively important when determining whether intensified competition destabilizes the banking market or not.