Browsing by Author "Toivanen, Otto"

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  • Takalo, Tuomas; Toivanen, Otto (2003)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 6/2003
    Published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Volume 114, Issue 2, June 2012: 601-628
    We study a financial market adverse selection model where all agents are endowed with initial wealth and choose to invest as entrepreneurs or financiers, or not to invest.We show that often a lack of outside finance leads to the emergence of financial markets where availability of outside finance leads to autarky.We find that i) there exist Pareto-efficient and inefficient equilibria; ii) adverse selection has more severe consequences for poorer economies; iii) increasing initial wealth may cause a shift from Pareto-efficient to inefficient equilibrium; iv) increasing the proportion of agents with positive NPV projects causes a shift from inefficient to efficient equilibrium; v) equilibrium financial contracts are either equity-like or 'pure' debt contracts; vi) agents with negative (positive) NPV projects earn rents only in (non-)wealth-constrained economies; vii) agents earn rents only when employing pure debt contracts; and viii) removing storage technology destroys the only Pareto-efficient equilibrium in non-wealth-constrained economies.Our model enables analysis of various policies concerning financial stability, the need for sophisticated financial institutions, development aid, and the promotion of entrepreneurship. Key words: financial market efficiency, adverse selection, financial contracts, creation of firms. JEL classification numbers: D58, G14, G20, G28, G32
  • Takalo, Tuomas; Tanayama, Tanja; Toivanen, Otto (2008)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 7/2008
    Published in Review of Economics and Statistics, March 2013, Vol. 95, No. 1, Pages 255-272
    This paper studies the welfare effects of R&D subsidies. We develop a model of continuous optimal treatment with outcome heterogeneity where the treatment outcome depends on applicant investment. The model takes into account heterogeneous application costs and identifies the treatment effect on the public agency running the programme. Under the assumption of a welfare-maximizing agency, we identify general equilibrium treatment effects. Applyiing our model to R&D project-level data we find substantial treatment effect heterogeneity. Agency-specific treatment effects are smaller than private treatment effects. We find that the rate of return on subsidies for the agency is 30-50%. Keywords: applications, effort, investment, R&D, selection, subsidies, treatment programme, treatment effects, welfare JEL classification numbers: 038, 031, L53, C31
  • Takalo, Tuomas; Tanayama, Tanja; Toivanen, Otto (2013)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 2/2013
    Published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 31, Issue 5, September 2013, Pages 634–642
    We extend the theoretical basis of the empirical literature on the effects of R&D subsidies by providing an estimable model of strategic interaction among subsidy applicants, and public and private sector R&D financiers. Our model incorporates fixed R&D costs and a cost of external finance. We derive the optimal support rule. At the intensive (extensive) margin the costs of external funding reduce (increase) the optimal subsidy rate. We also establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of additionality. It turns out that additionality at the intensive margin is less likely with large spillovers. Our results suggest that the relationship between additionality and welfare may not be straightforward. Keywords: R&D, entrepreneurial finance, R&D subsidies, innovation policy JEL classification numbers: O38, O31, L32, H25, G28
  • Hyytinen, Ari; Toivanen, Otto (2000)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 9/2000
    Whether or not banks are engaged in ex ante monitoring of customers may have important consequences for the whole economy.We approach this question via a model in which banks can invest in either information acquisition or market power (product differentiation). The two alternatives generate different predictions, which are tested using panel data on Finnish local banks.We find evidence that banks' investments in branch networks and human capital (personnel) contribute to information acquisition but not to market power.We also find that managing customers' money transactions enhances banks ability to control their lending risks.
  • Takalo, Tuomas; Tanayama, Tanja; Toivanen, Otto (2022)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 2/2022
    We construct a model of innovation incorporating R&D externalities, R&D participation, financial market imperfections, and application and allocation of R&D subsidies, estimate it using Finnish R&D project level data and conduct a welfare analysis. The intensive, not the extensive R&D margin is important. Financial market imperfections are small.Tax credits and subsidies do not reach first best R&D but increase R&D 29-47% compared to laissez-faire. Welfare effects are small: Tax credits increase welfare 1%; subsidies reduce welfare once application costs are taken into accout. In terms of fiscal cost, tax credits are 90% more expensive than R&D subsidies.
  • Takalo, Tuomas; Tanayama, Tanja; Toivanen, Otto (2017)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 30/2017
    We conduct a welfare analysis of R&D subsidies and tax credits using a model of innovation policy in corporating externalities, limited R&D participation and financial market imperfections. We estimate the model using R&D project level data from Finland. The optimal R&D tax credit rate (0.24) is lower than the average R&D subsidy rate (0.36). The intensive, not the extensive margin of R&D is important for policy. Tax credits and subsidies increase R&D investments and spillovers compared to laissez-faire but to levels below the first best. R&D support policies don't improve welfare.