Browsing by Subject "julkinen talous"

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  • Korhonen, Iikka (1997)
    IDÄNTALOUKSIEN KATSAUKSIA. REVIEW OF ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION 3/1997
    Russia's treasury bill market has taken off in recent years.The volume of outstanding stock has grown manyfold, so that the volume of trading on the secondary market is now enough to ensure liquidity.The yields of treasury bills, which once fluctuated wildly in response to trends in inflation and political uncertainty, have now settled to low enough levels where they may actually help stabilize Russian financial markets.If this, happens, we may soon expect to see increasing investments in production capacity. The T-bill market is mainly regulated by the Central Bank of Russia, which uses treasury bills as an instrument of monetary policy.Meanwhile, the government of the Federation of Russia has increasingly sought to use the T-bill market as a source of revenue.As the Central Bank of Russia will no longer extend direct credit to the government, inflation has naturally fallen.However, if there are to be further cuts in the yields of treasury bills, the government would probably have to curtail its borrowing.For this to happen the government must cut expenditures even further or improve its tax collection systems.
  • Marzo, Massimiliano; Romagnoli, Silvia; Zagaglia, Paolo (2008)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 25/2008
    We study the term structure implications of the fiscal theory of price level determination. We introduce the intertemporal budget constraint of the government in a general equilibrium model in continuous time. Fiscal policy is set according to a simple rule whereby taxes react proportionally to real debt. We show how to solve for the prices of real and nominal zero coupon bonds. Keywords: bond pricing, fiscal policy, mathematical methods JEL classification numbers: D9, G12
  • Bank of Finland (2016)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 3/2016
    One of the key objectives of the Government Programme is to raise the employment rate to 72% by the end of the parliamentary term. This means increasing the current number of people in employment by just over 100,000 by the end of 2019. If near-term economic growth is to remain around 1%, i.e. as foreseen in the baseline forecast, achievement of the objective will be unlikely. On the basis of the alternative scenario, attainment of the employment objective in the Government Programme requires markedly faster economic growth than at present. GDP growth in 2017–2019 should average 2.5% annually, i.e. about 1.3 percentage points faster than the baseline suggests, in order for the objective to be attained.
  • Liikanen, Erkki (2015)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 3/2015
    The Bank of Finland has emphasised that the problems of the Finnish economy are not primarily cyclical, but largely of a longer-term, structural nature. In addition to the weakness of the global economy, activity has been dampened by structural changes in Finnish industry, a contraction in the working-age population, weakening cost-competitiveness and, recently, also the difficulties in the Russian economy. As general government deficits have grown and a rapid increase in the population share of elderly people is looming, the longer-term outlook for the public finances has deteriorated. The Bank of Finland has pointed out that the key to resolving the serious problems in the economy lies in structural reforms, fiscal consolidation and improved cost-competitiveness.
  • Vlasov, Sergey (2013)
    BOFIT Online 9/2013
    This study examines Russia's short- and long run fiscal sustainability. The study reveals the possible risks, if fiscal sustainability deteriorates on the general government budget level. By employing a special fiscal stress index, Russia's public finances are evaluated as sustainable in the short run. In the long run, the study analyzes advantages and limitations of the new fiscal rules, compares the new rules with the previous fiscal rules suspended during the financial crisis and discusses the possibilities for further development of the fiscal rules in Russia. The official long run socio-economic development forecast is employed for the estimates. The analysis suggests that comparing to 2012 government revenue will decrease by 7.5 p.p. of GDP by 2050, explained by the drop in oil-and-gas revenue by 8.7 p.p. of GDP. Government expenditure will decrease by 6.0 p.p. of GDP. The value of government net worth will become negative by 2050 but on the infinite projection horizon should stabilize on the safe level close to -15% of GDP. Keywords: fiscal sustainability, fiscal stress index, fiscal rules, general government budget, budget forecast
  • Kinnunen, Helvi; Railavo, Jukka (2011)
    Bank of Finland bulletin. Economic outlook 5
    The macroeconomic effects of population ageing will be considerable. Projections with a general equilibrium model highlight a structural shift in the economy and a pronounced fall in the standard of living in the wake of population ageing. Total output will decline not only in response to a fall in labour input but also due to a shift in the output structure towards service sectors. A substantial increase in the tax ratio will, in practice, make labour markets other than the public labour market wither away, while the ratio of private consumption to GDP will fall permanently.
  • Angelini, Giovanni; Caggiano, Giovanni; Castelnuovo, Efrem; Fanelli, Luca (2020)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 13/2020
    How large are government spending and tax multipliers? The fiscal proxy-SVAR literature provides heterogeneous estimates, depending on which proxies - fiscal or non-fiscal - are used to identify fiscal shocks. We reconcile the existing estimates via flexible vector autoregressive model that allows to achieve identification in presence of a number of structural shocks larger than that of the available instruments. Our two main findings are the following. First, the estimate of the tax multiplier is sensitive to the assumption of orthogonality between total factor productivity (non-fiscal proxy) and tax shocks. If this correlation is assumed to be zero, the tax multiplier is found to be around one. If such correlation is nonzero, as supported by our empirical evidence, we find a tax multiplier three times as large. Second, we find the spending multiplier to be robustly larger than one across different models that feature different sets of instruments. Our results are robust to the joint employment of different fiscal and non-fiscal instruments.
  • Simachev, Yuri V.; Yakovlev, Andrei; Kuznetsov, Boris V.; Gorst, Michael Y.; Daniltsev, Aleksandr V.; Kuzyk, Michael N.; Smirnov, Sergey N. (2009)
    BOFIT Online 2009/6
    This paper presents the results of an analytical project on the methodology for assessing and monitoring anti-crisis measures taken by the government of the RF. The paper is based on an analysis of about 100 measures in support of Russia.s real economy that were initiated in October 2008 . March 2009. Within the scope of this analysis, we singled out the main beneficiaries by industry and the size of enterprise, and estimated the effects of the measures underway in the crisis phase and in the phase of a return to economic growth. The paper also gives an account of the major risks the Russian government will face in putting into practice the measures supporting the real economy, and reveals the key problems and inconsistencies of the anti-crisis program. Key words: Russia, anti-crisis measures, economic policy, state subsidies, fiscal policy.
  • Bank of Finland (2017)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 5/2017
    Finland’s rapid economic growth in 2017 has notably improved the situation for the public finances. With the cuts in taxes related to the Competitiveness Pact, fiscal policy will ease in 2017 and 2018 and the structural deficit will deepen. Moreover, the projected acceleration of economic growth will not resolve the longer-term problems associated with Finland’s public finances. Population ageing will push up public expenditure, while the contraction in the working-age population will rein in economic growth and thus weaken the funding base of the public finances. Growth in age-related expenditure will generate a sustainability gap that is still estimated at around 3% of GDP.
  • Bank of Finland (2019)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 5/2018
    Economic growth has supported the efforts to improve Finland’s general government finances in recent years. However, changes in the composition of public revenue and expenditure are hampering the achievement of a balanced budget position. In the medium term, reaching the fiscal policy objectives will not become easier. Growth in agerelated expenditure will make rebalancing of the public finances more difficult, and the fiscal sustainability gap is still considerable.
  • Kokkinen, Arto (2020)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 5/2019
    Sound fiscal policy should be conducted keeping in mind the economy’s long-term challenges. Finland's population structure is becoming increasingly unfavourable on account of its declining working-age population and growing share of the elderly. This imbalance, together with rising age-related expenditure, will create a situation for the public finances where long-term general government expenditure is expected to exceed its revenue. In addition to the aforementioned sustainability gap, sound fiscal policy will prepare for future recessions and negative surprises.
  • Bank of Finland (2021)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 6/2020
    During the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, fiscal policy has been deployed to support households and businesses hit by the crisis. At the same time, fiscal stimulus has been stepped up to bolster economic recovery. After the crisis, once the economy has returned to a sustainable growth path, the upward trend in the public debt-to-GDP ratio must be halted and fiscal space rebuilt. Changing the course of the public finances will require broad consensus on long-term objectives, clear short-term interim targets, and concrete measures over the coming years. With the coinciding rise in age-related expenditure, rebalancing the public finances will be difficult.
  • Bank of Finland (2021)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 5/2021
    Managing the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic still requires a lot of work, but in many sectors of Finland’s economy the engines are already firing on all cylinders. The elevated structural deficit in the country’s public finances will need to be remedied in the wake of the pandemic, when the longer term expenditure pressures related to an ageing population start to swell steadily, turning into today’s issues and problems. At the same time, future challenges such as climate change mitigation call for political action, and this will also affect the fiscal balance and the level of debt. In fiscal policy there must be a return towards more balanced budgets, but new spending on matters that are always deemed indispensable makes this difficult.
  • Bank of Finland (2017)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 5/2016
    Finland's fiscal situation is challenging. The general government deficit is still high, and public debt is on an upward trend. Attainment of more balanced public finances is hampered not only by high unemployment-related and other social security expenditure but also by rapid growth in age-related spending and low economic growth. Therefore, the problems with public finances cannot be explained by cyclical factors alone. Rather, there is a significant and long-term structural problem with Finland's public finances. The public debt problem makes the Finnish economy more vulnerable to global economic disruptions.
  • Bank of Finland (2019)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 3/2019
    Finland’s economic growth will slow in the forecast period to close to its potential rate. GDP will grow 1.6% in 2019 and 1.5% in 2020. Thereafter, the pace of growth will ease to 1.3% in 2021.
  • Bank of Finland (2021)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 5/2021
    Recovery continues – monetary policy under conflicting pressures 3 Economy growing in the shadow of the virus 7 Supply-side disruptions slow growth also in Finland 31 Assessment of public finances 2021: Time for fiscal policy to refocus on the future 37 Long-term sustainability of the public finances 50 Finland’s new long-term forecast suggests GDP growth will be more subdued 55 Supply bottlenecks are having wide-spread impacts on the economy 69 Forecast tables for 2021–2024 (December 2021) 85
  • Bank of Finland (2020)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 3/2020
    The worst-case scenario in the corona spring did not materialise, but we will still need stamina for the long haul 3 Forecast tables for 2020–2022 (June 2020) 7
  • Bank of Finland (2020)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 5/2019
    Editorial: Finland’s economic transition still incomplete 3 Finland’s economic boom over 7 Alternative scenario: Recovery in global economy delayed 36 Assessment of public finances 2019 42 Investment weakened by uncertainty and the structure of the Finnish economy 53 Sustainability gap larger than previously projected 64 Forecast tables for 2019–2022 (December) 72
  • Bank of Finland (2017)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 5/2017
    Finland’s economic growth is broadly based, exports are fuelling growth and at the same time domestic demand continues to be strong. According to the Bank of Finland forecast, Finland’s GDP will grow 3.1% in 2017 and 2.5% in 2018. Over the years 2019–2020 the economy will grow approximately 1.5% per annum. Inflation will gather pace but throughout the forecast period will be slower than elsewhere in the euro area.
  • Rasi, Chris-Marie (1992)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 66 ; 10 ; October