Browsing by Subject "kilpailu (toiminta)"

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  • Suominen, Matti (1991)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 8/1991
    This paper extends Bresnahan's (1982) test of competition to the two-product case. Applying this extension, as well as Bresnahan's original one-product test to the Finnish banking industry before and after the deregulation of financial markets produces some interesting results. With the two product model, a degree of imperfect competition is identified both in deposit and loan markets in the latter half of 1980s. The one product test, on the other hand, indicates that the competition was fairly intense before this. Besides the estimates of the degree of competition, 1 find evidence of economies of scope in deposit-taking and lending activities of banks. In addition, the paper discusses the concepts of price and output in banking.
  • Fungáčová, Zuzana; Shamshur, Anastasiya; Weill, Laurent (2016)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 6/2016
    Published in Journal of Banking and Finance, 83, October, 2017, 104–120
    Despite the extensive debate on the effects of bank competition, only a handful of single-country studies deal with the impact of bank competition on the cost of credit. We contribute to the literature by investigating the impact of bank competition on the cost of credit in a cross-country setting. Using a panel of firms from 20 European countries covering the period 2001–2011, we consider a broad set of measures of bank competition, including two structural measures (Herfindahl-Hirschman index and CR5), and two non-structural indicators (Lerner index and H-statistic). We find that bank competition increases the cost of credit and observe that the positive influence of bank competition is stronger for smaller companies. Our findings accord with the information hypothesis, whereby a lack of competition incentivizes banks to invest in soft information and conversely increased competition raises the cost of credit. This positive impact of bank competition is however influenced by the institutional and economic framework, as well as by the crisis.
  • Lv, Bingyang; Liu, Yongzheng; Li, Yan; Ding, Siying (2018)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 20/2018
    This paper explores how fiscal incentives offered to local governments in China affect investment rates in their jurisdictions. Theoretically, we build a simple fiscal competition model to establish the linkage between local fiscal incentives and expenditure policy and consequently, capital movement. The key prediction of the model, borne out by data from Chinese provinces spanning 2004–2013, is that an increase in the local corporate income tax-sharing ratio, which proxies fiscal incentives offered to local governments, motivates local governments to compete for capital investment through increased public expenditures. Our results contribute to the fiscal federalism literature by showing that local fiscal incentives significantly shape policy choices and local economic performance. In addition, by exploring fiscal incentives offered to local governments, we offer a novel explanation for the unusually high investment rate in China that has been sustained over a prolonged period of time.
  • Suominen, Matti (1993)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 12/1993
    This paper suggests that the optimal contract in lending under asymmetric information is a fixed rate loan contract. It is shown that deposit banks have an advantage to provide maturity transformation with fixed rate contracts. This is because the spatial nature of deposit market competition makes the oligopolistic cooperation likely. Cooperation, on the other hand, provides banks more stable funding when depositors derive utility from both monetary compensation (interest) and the proximity of banks services. lt is also shown that by committing in loan markets to fixed rate returns banks can reduce their incentives to compete over deposits.
  • Johnson, Leslie T. (1990)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 25/1990
    The future deve1opment, of retail banking and the structural changes that are occurring, and are expected to occur after 1992, are two issues which dominate current discussions concerning banking in Europe. Both issues are inter-related and, of course, both have imp1ications for bank regu1ation. In an attempt to contribute to the debate, this paper presents survey data obtained from retail banks in thirteen European countries'and highlights differences between banks in EC countries with those in EFTA countries. We are also concerned with the regulatory implications of the data and, having discussed why banks should be regu1ated at all, conclude that banks should be regulated on a functional basis, and that banks should not be permitted to engage in non-banking activities, nor non-banks permitted to undertake banking business.
  • Kultti, Klaus; Takalo, Tuomas; Vähämaa, Oskari (2018)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 20/2018
    We study the ability of competitive coordination service platforms (such as auction sites and real estate agents) to facilitate trade in a directed search model where buyers have unit demands and each seller only has one good to sell. The sellers’ capacity constraint leads to a coordination problem as in a symmetric equilibrium without intermediation some sellers receive multiple buyers while some are left without any customers. We compare this equilibrium to one where sellers and buyers can choose to become intermediaries who coordinate the meetings. We find that roughly 20 percent of agents become intermediaries. As a result, a large part of the supply and demand in the economy vanishes. Moreover, the large amount of intermediaries actually reduces the meeting efficiency. Jointly, these effects imply that the gains from trade are roughly 25 percent lower than in the economy without intermediation.
  • Pauli, Ralf (1991)
    Suomen Pankki. A 81
    Esipuhe 1 Johdanto 1.1 Keskuspallkkien tehtävistä yleensä 1.2 Selvityksen näkökulma ja rajaus 2 Sääntelyn ja valvonnan tarve ja tavoitteet 2.1 Sääntelyn purkamisesta uudelleensääntelyyn 13 2.2 Mitä tarkoitetaan rahoitusmarkkinoiden vakaudella? 15 2.3 Mitä tarkoitetaan rahoitusmarkkinoiden tehokkuudella? 17 2.4 Vakauden ja tehokkuuden välisestä yhteydestä 21 2.5 Rahoitusjärjestelmän tärkeys ja häiriöalttius 24 3 Pankkien palvelutuotannon suurentaminen ja monipuolistaminen 3.1 Tuotannon suurentaminen ja monipuolistaminen pankkien näkökulmasta 3.2 Empiirisiä tuloksia 3.3 Tuotannon suurentaminen ja monipuolistaminen valvojan näkökulmasta 3.4 Pankki- ja vakuutuspalveluiden yhteistuotanto 4 Rahoitustoiminnan arvopaperistuminen 4.1 Arvopaperistuminen 4.2 Arvopaperistuminen pankkien kannalta 4.3 Arvopaperistuminen valvojan näkökulmasta 5 Suojajärjestelmät 5.1 Keskuspankin hätärahoitus 5.2 Talletusten vakuutusjätjestelmä 5.3 Hätärahoitukseen sisältyvä moral hazard -ongelma 5.4 Talletusten vakuuttamiseen sisältyvä moral hazard -ongelma 5.5 Keskuspankin hätärahoituksen ja talletusten vakuutusjärjestelmän välisestä yhteydestä 6 Lopuksi Liite Kirjallisuusl uettelo Summary
  • Suomen Pankki (1990)
    Suomen Pankki. A 77
    ESIPUHE Juha Savela PANKKIEN VAKAVARAISUUSVAATIMUKSIEN UUSIMINEN Sampo Alhonsuo LIIKEPANKIT SUOMESSA JA EUROOPAN YHTEISÖN MAISSA - TEHOKKUUDEN JA KANNATTAVUUDEN VERTAILU Sampo Alhonsuo - Johanna Pensala PANKKIEN JA VAKUUTUSYHTIÖIDEN YHTEISTOIMINTA JA TOIMIALALIUKUMINEN Tom Kokkola - Matti Viren KESKUSPANKIN KUSTANNUSRASITUS ERI MAISSA SUMMARY
  • Moreno, Diego; Takalo, Tuomas (2021)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 3/2021
    We study the optimal precision of public information disclosures about banks assets quality. In our model the precision of information affects banks' cost of raising funding and asset profile riskiness. In an imperfectly competitive banking sector, banks'stability and social surplus are non-monotonic functions of precision: an intermediate precision (or low-to-intermediate precision if banks contract their repayment promises on public information) maximizes stability, and also yields the maximum surplus when the social cost of bank failure c is large. When c is small and the banks' asset risk taking is not too sensitive to changes in the precision, the maximum surplus (and maximum risk) are reached at maximal precision. In a perfectly competitive banking sector in which banks' asset risk taking is not too sensitive to the precision of information, the maximum surplus (and maximum risk) are reached at maximal precision, while maximum stability is reached at minimal precision.
  • Takalo, Tuomas (2019)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 15/2019
    Published in Journal of the Finnish Economic Association 2020 ; 1 https://www.taloustieteellinenyhdistys.fi/journal-of-finnish-economic-association-1-2020/
    I calibrate switching cost for the Finnish retail deposit market by using the approach developed by Oz Shy (2002). It turns out that switching costs faced by deposit customers of the main banks are high, ranging from 200 euros to nearly 1,400 euros. Over the past 20 years, switching costs have increased by roughly 50% in real terms, but in relation to average account balance, switching costs have not essentially changed. I conjecture that differences in the switching costs among the Finnish banks might be explained by differences in their loyalty programs.
  • Sõrg, Mart (1990)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 21/1990
    Tämä tutkimus on Suomen Pankin tutkimusosastolla kolme kuukautta kestäneen tutustumis- ja työvierailuni yksi tulos. Pyrkimykseni on siinä kuvata Viron käynnissä olevan rahatalouden uudistuksen alkuvaiheita ja ennakoida sen tulevaa kehitystä. Koska käytettävissäni on ollut lähinnä vain Suo.men Pankissa saatavissa ollut aineisto, en ole voinut kaikkialla nojautua alkuperäislähteisiin enkä myöskään aivan uusimpiin tilastotietoihin. Tiettyä varauksellisuutta arviooni aiheutuu mYös Neuvostoliiton taloutta koskevien tietojen epämääräisyydestä ja mahdollisesta poliittisesta sävyttyneisyydestä.