Browsing by Subject "monitorointi"

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  • Newton, David P.; Ongena, Steven; Xie, Ru; Zhao, Binru (2022)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2022
    Is bank- versus market-based financing different in its attitudes towards Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) risk? Using a novel sample covering 3,783 U.S. public firms from 2007 to 2020, we study how firm-level ESG risk affects its financing outcomes. We find that companies with higher ESG risk borrow less from banks than from markets, potentially to avoid bank monitoring and scrutiny. The Social and Governance components, in particular, matter. Furthermore, firms suffering higher numbers of negative ESG reputation shocks are less likely to continue to rely on bank credit in response to lenders' threats to end the lending arrangements. Finally, our results indicate that firms' ESG risk reduces after borrowing from banks but increases after bond issuance, suggesting that banks are more effective than public bond markets in shaping borrowers' ESG performance.
  • Järvenpää, Maija; Paavola, Aleksi (2021)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 2/2021
    An asset is money-like if investors have no incentives to acquire costly private information on the underlying collateral. However, privately provided money-like assets—like prime money market fund (MMF) shares—are prone to runs if investors suddenly start to question the value of the collateral. Therefore, for risky assets, lack of money-likeness is a necessary condition for lack of run incentives. But is it a sufficient one? This paper studies the effect of the U.S. money market fund reform of 2014–2016 on investor monitoring, money-likeness and stability of institutional prime MMFs. Using the number of distinct IP addresses accessing MMFs’ regulatory reports as a proxy for investor monitoring, we find that the reform increased monitoring and thus decreased money-likeness of institutional prime funds. However, we also show that after the reform, institutional prime funds that are more likely to impose the newly introduced redemption restrictions are more monitored, suggesting that investors may monitor in order to avoid being hit by the restrictions. Overall, our results indicate that increased monitoring, or decreased money-likeness, has not made institutional prime MMFs run-free, and it may have actually created a new source of fragility for MMFs.