Browsing by Subject "pankkikriisit"

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  • Honkapohja, Seppo (2009)
    EURO & TALOUS 1
    Meneillään oleva rahoituskriisi on nyt kestänyt runsaan vuoden. Sodanjälkeisenä aikana nykyinen kriisi on kehittyneiden talouksien 19:s ja tämän vuosisadan ensimmäinen. Tuoreessa tutkimuksessaan Carmen Reinhard ja Kenneth Rogoff (2008) ovat jaotelleet tämänhetkistä Yhdysvaltain subprime-kriisiä edeltäneet 18 kriisiä viiteen suureen ja pienempiin kriiseihin. Viiteen suureen sisältyvät Norjan, Suomen ja Ruotsin 1990-luvun alkuun ajoittuneet kriisit. Norjan kriisi alkoi jo 1980-luvun lopulla, mutta jatkui 1990-luvulle.
  • Lukkarila, Johanna (2003)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 3/2003
    Monet maat ovat 1990-luvun alun jälkeen luopuneet kiinteän mutta ajoittain muutettavan valuuttakurssin järjestelmästä.Tässä työssä arvioidaan, miten Aasian tapahtumien jälkeen kehitellyt niin kutsutut kolmannen sukupolven valuuttakriisimallit selittävät Aasian kriisiä.Lisäksi teorioita ja Aasian tapahtumia verrataan Venäjän ja Turkin viimeisiin rahoituskriiseihin.Tarkastelu osoittaa, etteivät perinteiset teoriat ole menettäneet merkitystään kriisien selittäjinä.Uusia malleja ja mallien yhdistämistä kuitenkin tarvitaan, sillä viimeaikaisiin kriiseihin on yhä useammin liittynyt sekä pankki- että valuuttakriisien piirteitä.Avain-sanat: valuuttakriisit, pankkikriisit, kehittyvät markkinat, Aasia, Turkki, Venäjä JEL-luokittelu: F31, F32, F41
  • Herrala, Risto (2001)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 1/2001
    We sketch a theoretical framework for comparing the properties of funded LOLR schemes.We construct an idealized lender of last resort and investigate how it formulates policy under alternative public and private governance structures.The alternatives are a (first-best) social utility maximizer that can dictate participation, and three voluntary schemes: a public lender of last resort, a mutual clearing house that formulates policy by voting, and a profit maximizing private LOLR scheme.We compare the policies formulated by these institutions from the viewpoint of social desirability.Our model targets the debate on free banking, in particular the issue of whether private institutions would fare well as lenders of last resort.In our model, the first-best LOLR scheme always covers the whole banking sector and offers full insurance to the participants.We find that voluntary schemes succeed relatively well as lenders of last resort in situations where recipients of LOLR assistance can repay LOLR loans with interest.In this case, the LOLR can use interest rate policy to make the scheme attractive to banks of every quality and thus create incentives for comprehensive entry.In private schemes, policy tends to be distorted if the private scheme is the only possible scheme.However, competitive forces lead private institutions to approach the first-best outcome, which is the only contestable outcome.The end result changes when we investigate a situation in which banks' ability to repay LOLR loans is limited. When lending is associated with losses for the LOLR, good quality banks will tend to stay out of the LOLR scheme and participation in voluntary schemes will always fall short of the first-best outcome. A compulsory scheme (such as a central bank that can impose a reserve requirement on banks) has an advantage over voluntary schemes.Key words: liquidity, lender of last resort, banking, central banking, governance
  • Rantama, Jaana (2001)
    BOFIT Online 2001/9
    Viron, Latvian ja Liettuan pankkijärjestelmät alkoivat kehittyä 1990-luvun alussa.Alkuvaihe oli voimakkaan kasvun ja kriisien aikaa.Pankit opettelivat toimimaan markkinaympäristössä ja pankkien sääntelykehikon luominen aloitettiin.Sääntelykehikon kehittäminen jatkuu edel-leen, kun lakeja ja määräyksiä kehitetään länsimaisten standardien ja EU:n direktiivien mukaisiksi. Ulkomaiset sijoittajat, erityisesti ruotsalaiset pankit, ovat olleet keskeisessä roolissa Baltian maiden pankkijärjestelmien vakauttamisessa.Rahoituksen välitys on vahvasti pankki-en varassa, mutta etenkin Virossa rahoitusyhtiöiden merkitys on kasvanut.Osa kansainvälisesti havaittavissa olevista pankkitoiminnan kehityssuunnista on nähtävissä myös Baltian maissa: teknologian kehittymisen hyödyntäminen, rakennemuutokset fuusion ja yritysostoin sekä toimialaliukumat.
  • Haajanen, Jyrki (2010)
    Bank of Finland. Financial market report 2
    The financial crisis has increased demands that the banking sector contribute more to the costs of crises. The EU Commission has proposed the establishment of national resolution funds that would be funded by a levy on banks and used for the resolution of future financial crises. Initiatives for a global bank tax are however progressing slowly, as G20 finance ministers were unable to agree on a common approach to a bank levy.
  • Kuusterä, Antti; Tarkka, Juha (Otava, 2012)
    6 Acknowledgements 9 Turn of an era 18 Bank of Finland in the war years 36 Wartime financial markets 50 Foreign relations and foreign exchange 81 After the war 94 Banknote clipping 102 Finland joins the international monetary system 133 Seeking a monetary policy line 168 The Finnish monetary policy model 189 Politicians and bankers 198 From general strike to devaluation 219 Modernising the currency act 236 Indexing in banking 242 From devaluation to devaluation: monetary policy with a convertible markka 269 The OKO affair: Bank of Finland as the guardian of stability 280 Reform of banking legislation 295 The Institute for Economic Research and the emergence of incomes policy 307 From reconstruction to industrialisation 325 Bank of Finland turns to restructuring policy 346 Quest for stability in an unstable world 370 Inflation takes off 391 “A national emergency” 403 Changing tools of monetary policy
  • Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka (2002)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/2002
    Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol 159 no 3 (2003), pp. 511-522 as "Maturity transformation without maturity mismatch and bank panics"
    This paper discusses recent bank runs in seven transition economies (Russia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania), comparing them against the older US experience and theoretical research.Bank runs seem to usually be information based.For example, improvements in bank transparency such as new accounting rules can reveal a bank s insolvency and trigger a run. However, bank runs, as seen a few years ago in East Asia, Bulgaria and Russia, may also be accompanied by runs on national currencies. We include a bank run model that shows a bank may issue liquid demand deposits and avoid runs without deposit insurance as long as it also issues less liquid time deposits.Self-fulfilling runs are prevented through elimination of the maturity mismatch.The well-known Diamond & Dybvig (1983) model is modified to account for depositors risk af-finities, whereby high-risk depositors hold their savings as demand deposits and low-risk depositors prefer time deposits.These deposit choices transfer liquidity optimally from low-risk to high-risk depositors who value liquidity.By exploiting these choices, a bank can improve its intertemporal risk-sharing by issuing deposits of varying degrees of liquid-ity. This maturity transformation does not necessarily raise the economy s total liquidity. Key words: transition economies, bank panics, bank regulation, financial crises
  • Kinnunen, Helvi; Vihriälä, Vesa (1999)
    Bank of Finland. Discussion papers 13/1999
    The paper examines the role of bank relationships in business closures during the Finnish economic crisis of the early 1990s.We utilise a unique panel data set of 474 small and medium-sized firms, for which we have standard accounting information and for which we can in addition identify whether the firm had a lending relationship with the most troubled part of the banking system, namely the Savings Bank of Finland and Skopbank.By estimating a logit model we find that, even accounting for the effects of liquidity, profitability, indebtedness, age and size, firms that had a lending relationship with the savings banks concerned were more likely to close in 1992 than other firms that year or the same firms in other years.Thus being a loan customer of these banks entailed greater risk for firms than having a lending relationship with other intermediaries only in 1992, which was the year the banking sector came to a head.The result lends support to the hypothesis that financial factors affect real outcomes not only through firm and household balance sheets but also through bank behaviour.
  • Topi, Jukka (2008)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 12/2008
    In this paper, I develop a model that addresses the links between banks liquidity outlook and their incentives to take credit risk. Assuming that both bank-specific liquidity shocks and credit losses are necessary to provoke bank runs, the model predicts that a bank s incentives to mitigate its credit risk by screening decrease if the probability of a bank-specific liquidity shock declines. This suggests that the benign liquidity outlook prevailing prior to the subprime crisis may have contributed to the lack of screening by banks that has been an important causal factor in the crisis.
  • Kiema, Ilkka; Jokivuolle, Esa (2019)
    Revue de l'OFCE
    Empirical evidence shows that a financial distress, faced by a bank or the whole economy, might cause large-scale withdrawals of deposits even when bank deposits are protected by deposit insurance, implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by a government. Building on Kiema and Jokivuolle (2015), we present a new model of such partial bank runs. In our model withdrawals are caused by the fear that both the bank and the government's deposit guarantee might fail in the future. Our focus is on a guarantee rather than on insurance, since the assets of deposit insurance funds might not be sufficient in large-scale systemic crises. Guarantee failure is possible because, being sovereign, the government may choose not to keep its promises. This option causes a fixed welfare cost (e.g. a reputational cost), which in a sufficiently severe crisis may be smaller than the costs from deposit guarantee payments. We also assume that, being welfare-maximizing, the government recapitalizes the bank during the early stage of the bank run. When decisions concerning deposit guarantee payments are made, recapitalization costs are already sunk costs, but the partial bank run has reduced the coverage costs that the remaining deposits might cause for the government. In this way, the depositors who withdraw funds during a partial bank run decrease the danger of a deposit guarantee failure and increase the incentives of the remaining depositors to keep their deposits in the bank. We apply our framework to the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), and we view the reliability of the Single Resolution Fund and its backstop as the counterpart to the reliability of the government's promises. It turns out that in an asymmetric shock that affects only a single eurozone country, the EDIS improves bank stability, but its effects might be ambiguous in a systemic crisis that affects the whole Banking Union.
  • Claeys, Sophie; Lanine, Gleb; Schoors, Koen (2005)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2005
    Published in Journal of Comparative Economics, September 2007, Vol. 35, No. 3, p. 630-657 and University of Michigan ; The William Davidson Institute 2005 ; 778.
    We focus on the con.ict between two central bank objectives individual bank stability and systemic stability.We study the licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) during 1999.2002.Banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined adequately, and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy protection from license withdrawal, which suggests a tacit concern for systemic stability.The CBR is also found reluctant to with- draw licenses from banks that violate the individual's deposits-to-capital ratio as this conflicts with the tacit CBR objective to secure depositor confidence and systemic stability.Keywords: Bank supervision, bank crisis, Russia.JEL Classification : G2 N2 E5
  • Kauko, Karlo; Tölö, Eero (2019)
    Applied Economics Quarterly 4
    Also as BoF Economics Review 4/2019 http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:bof-201906061225
    Indicators based on the ratio of credit to GDP have been found to be highly useful predictors of banking crises. Differences in this ratio seem a highly promising early warning indicator. We test a large number of slightly different versions of the differenced credit-to-GDP ratio with data on euro area members. The optimal time interval of the difference is about two years. Using the moving average of GDP over several years rather than the latest annual data is shown to have little impact on forecasting performance. The proposed indicator demonstrates particular promise at relatively short forecasting horizons (2–3 years).
  • Kauko, Karlo; Tölö, Eero (2019)
    BoF Economics Review 4/2019
    Published in Applied Economics Quarterly 2019 ; 65 ; 9 http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:bof-202002181134
    Indicators based on the ratio of credit to GDP have been found to be highly useful predictors of banking crises. We study the difference in this ratio as an early warning indicator. We test a large number of different versions of the differenced credit-to-GDP ratio with data on Euro area members. The optimal time interval of the difference is about two years. Using the moving average of GDP instead of the latest annual data has little impact on forecasting performance. The indicator is a particularly promising choice at relatively short forecasting horizons, such as two or three years.
  • Pesola, Jarmo (2005)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 13/2005
    The macroeconomic determinants of banking sector distresses in the Nordic countries, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain and the UK are analysed using an econometric model estimated on panel data from partly the early 1980s to 2002.The dependent variable is the ratio of banks' loan losses to lending.In addition to the lagged dependent variable, the explanatory variables include a surprise change in incomes and real interest rates, both variables as a separate cross-product term with lagged aggregate indebtedness.The underlying macroeconomic account that this paper puts forward is that loan losses are basically generated by strong adverse aggregate shocks under high exposure of banks to such shocks.The underlying innovations to income and real interest rates are constructed using published macro-economic forecast for these variables.According to the results, high customer indebtedness combined with adverse macroeconomic surprise shocks to income and real interest rates contributed to the distress in banking sector. Loan losses also display strong autoregressive behaviour which might indicate a feedback effect from loan losses back to macroeconomic level in deep recessions.The results can be used in macro stresstesting the banking sector. Key words: financial fragility, shock, loan loss, banking crisis JEL Classification numbers: G21, E44
  • Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka; Mälkönen, Ville (2009)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 16/2009
    Published in Journal of Financial Stability, Volume 8, Issue 2, April 2012: 84-95
    This paper examines blanket guarantee and restructuring decisions in respect of a multinational bank (MNB) using Nash bargaining, when the threat of a panic motivates countries to take decisions quickly. The failure of the bank would cause unevenly distributed externalities between the countries concerned, which influences restructuring incentives. In equilibrium, the bank is either liquidated or one or both of the countries recapitalizes it. The partition of the recapitalisation costs is sensitive to the country-specific benefits and costs from recapitalisation, panics and liquidation. The home regulator benefits from the privilege of being the only entity that can legally liquidate the MNB. Rational expectations regarding the bargaining result affect the incentives to declare a blanket guarantee.
  • Virtanen, Timo; Tölö, Eero; Virén, Matti; Taipalus, Katja (2018)
    Journal of Financial Stability June 2018
    We consider the effectiveness of unit root exuberance tests in predicting banking crises. Using a sample of 15 EU countries over the past three decades, our crisis dating follows the scheme of the European Systemic Risk Board. The exuberance indicators slightly outperform benchmark signaling and logit models. Variables based on credit- and debt-service are identified as better predictors than housing market variables, which in turn outperform stock market variables. The results corroborate the existing literature, which says financial crises are typically preceded by leveraged bubbles, and more specifically, that initial bubble signals from explosive growth in credit and asset prices are followed by a lift-off in debt-servicing costs as a financial crisis nears. The risk of financial crisis peaks just after the bubble bursts. Our results indicate that exuberance tests, which can be used in crisis prediction in a manner similar to conventional early warning models, may be readily incorporated into the toolkit of financial stability supervisors.
  • Vihriälä, Vesa (1997)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 71 ; 3 ; March
  • Savolainen, Eero; Vauhkonen, Jukka (2015)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 2/2015
    The consequences of a banking crisis could be exceptionally severe in Finland’s concentrated banking system. Regulatory means must therefore be deployed to ensure the capital adequacy and liquidity of Finnish banks remain strong under all circumstances.
  • Herrala, Risto (2009)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 10/2009
    In this paper we test the hypothesis that credit policies are pro-cyclical. Our approach is based on a stochastic frontier analysis of borrower data, as in Chen and Wang (2008). We extend the applicability of the approach, and propose a novel test specification which is informative of many types of pro-cyclicality. The analysis of representative samples of household borrowers during a huge cycle and its aftermath yields evidence of time-varying credit policy. We find that the focus of credit policy changed from collateral to current income during the cycle. Instead of a credit crunch, ie, an overall tightening of credit during the economic and financial contraction, we find a tightening of credit limits with respect to a minority of borrowers and an easing for the majority. In the course of the post-crisis period, credit policy became more lenient. Both the level of credit limits and the 'tailoring' of limits to group-specific characteristics of households increased. A reduction in the idiosyncratic variance of limits suggest that banks have become more consistent in their credit policies. Keywords credit policy, credit constraints, household borrowing, frontier analysis JEL classification numbers D14, E32, E51, G21
  • Bonin, John; Wachtel, Paul (2004)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 22/2004
    Published in Systemic Financial Crises: Resolving Large Bank Insolvencies, D. Evanoff, G. Kaufman, eds., World Publishing, 2005 and Leonard S. Stern School of Business, New York University, Working paper EC-04-31.
    We examine the efforts of transition economies to deal with financial fragility and resolve banking cries We characterize the birthing process of banking in transition and the three essential features of banking crises in transition economies: (i) bad loans and the relationship to state owned industries, (ii) development of institutional infrastructure and (iii) credible commitments to resolution and privatization.We then discuss the experiences of seven important transition countries in order to identify the salient features of their efforts to resolve banking crises.