Browsing by Subject "pankkitoiminta"

Sort by: Order: Results:

Now showing items 1-20 of 1121
  • Verona, Fabio; Martins, Manuel M. F.; Drumond, Inês (2013)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 4/2013
    Published in International Journal of Central Banking, Volume 9, Number 3, September 2013, Pages 73-117 ;
    Motivated by the U.S. events of the 2000s, we address whether a too low for too long interest rate policy may generate a boom-bust cycle. We simulate anticipated and unanticipated monetary policies in state-of-the-art DSGE models and in a model with bond financing via a shadow banking system, in which the bond spread is calibrated for normal and optimistic times. Our results suggest that the U.S. boom-bust was caused by the combination of (i) interest rates that were too low for too long, (ii) excessive optimism and (iii) a failure of agents to anticipate the extent of the abnormally favourable conditions. Keywords: DSGE model, shadow banking system, too low for too long, boom-bust JEL codes: E32, E44, E52, G24
  • Kiema, Ilkka; Jokivuolle, Esa (2013)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 25/2013
    The aim of the Internal Ratings Based Approach (IRBA) of Basel II was that capital suffices for unexpected losses with at least a 99.9% probability. However, because only a fraction of the required regulatory capital (a quarter to a half) had to be loss absorbing capital, the actual bank solvency probabilities may have been much lower, as the global financial crisis illustrates. Our estimates suggest that under Basel II IRBA the loss-absorbing capital of an average-quality portfolio bank suffices for unexpected losses with a 95%-99% probability. This translates into an expected bank failure rate as high as once in twenty years. Even if the bank s interest income is incorporated into our model, the expected failure rate is still substantial. We show that the expected failure rate increases with loan portfolio riskiness. Our calculations may be viewed as a measure of regulatory "self-delusion" included in Basel II capital requirements. Keywords: capital requirements, Internal Ratings Based Approach, Basel II,financial crisis.
  • Topi, Jukka (2015)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 2/2015
    Financial crises and other serious financial disruptions may be caused by several different types of risks. Macroprudential policy, designed to prevent such crises, needs a more diversified set of tools than are available in Finland at present. Although the Board of the Financial Supervisory Authority already has access to a number of macroprudential instruments, there is reason for the toolkit to be supplemented. There is a need for instruments to ensure capital adequacy in the Finnish banking sector and, if necessary, prevent the housing market overheating.
  • Mayes, David G. (1997)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 18/1997
    Viimeisen vuosikymmenen pankkikriisit ovat herättäneet huolestumista monissa teollisuusmaissa.Tässä raportissa tarkastellaan Uudessa-Seelannissa vuonna 1996 käyttöön otetun, julkistamisperiaatteeseen nojautuvan pankkivalvontajärjestelmän etuja.Vaikka Uudella-Seelannilla on monia erityispiirteitä, jotka tekevät uudesta järjestelmästä juuri sille erityisen soveliaan, soveltuvat järjestelmän kaikki pääperiaatteet muuhunkin OECD-alueeseen, myös nykyisen EU-lainsäädännön yhteyteen.Nämä periaatteet ovat seuraavat: 1) yritysjohdon kontrollin laadun varmistaminen ja laadukkaat laskentatoimen ja riippumattoman tilintarkastuksen standardit rahoituslaitoksissa, jotka haluavat pankkitoimiluvan 2) markkinakurin edellyttämän konkreettisen informaation julkistaminen yksittäisten pankkien riskinotosta; informaatioon on sisällyttävä pankkien koko toimintaa koskevat value-at-risk -laskelmat 3) pankkien johdon ja hallinnon pitäminen vastuullisina pankkien liiketoiminnan asiaankuuluvasta varovaisuudesta; tähän kuuluvat rangaistukset ja taloudellinen vastuu virheellisistä tiedoista 4) veronmaksajien varojen vaarantamisen välttäminen antamalla ymmärtää, että mikään pankki ei ole liian iso kaatumaan, ja keskittämällä valvontaviranomaisten toimet sen varmistamiseen, että ne voivat puuttua asioihin ja estää koko rahoitusjärjestelmän kannalta haitalliset seuraukset yksittäisen pankin joutuessa vaikeuksiin. Näillä keinoin voidaan merkittävästi vähentää pankkivalvontaan liittyvää moraalikatoa ja valvonnan kustannuksia. Asiasanat: rahoitusmarkkinoiden valvonta, markkinakuri, järjestelmän vakaus
  • Hasan, Iftekhar; Xie, Ru (2012)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 8/2012
    Published in Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Volume 49, Issue 2, 1 March 2013, Pages 4-18 as Foreign bank entry and bank corporate governance in China
    China employs a unique foreign bank entry model. Instead of allowing full foreign control of domestic banks, foreign investors are only permitted to be involved in the local banks as minority shareholders. At the same time, foreign strategic investors are expected to commit to bank corporate governance improvement and new technology support. In this context, the paper examines the effect of foreign strategic investors on Chinese bank performance. Based on a unique data set of bank ownership, performance, corporate governance and stock returns from 2003 to 2007, our regression and event study analysis results suggest that active involvement of foreign strategic investors in bank management have improved the corporate governance model of Chinese banks from a control based model to a market oriented model, and accordingly have promoted bank performance. JEL Classification Code: G21, G28, G34, F23 Keywords: China, Foreign Market Entry, Corporate Governance
  • Jokivuolle, Esa; Peura, Samu (2001)
    Bank of Finland. Discussion papers 15/2001
    The rating-sensitive capital charges on credit risks under the new Basel Accord are likely to increase the volatility of minimum capital requirements, which may force banks to hold larger capital cushions in excess of minimum requirements.We analyse this claim on the basis of numerical simulations on hypothetical bank portfolios, in which the bank's choice of capital cushion is assumed to satisfy a value-at-risk-type constraint.The results suggest that the size of the cushion depends on the bank's credit portfolio risk and its chosen approach for calculating the minimum capital requirement.Although the more ratings-sensitive internal ratings based approach imposes lower minimum capital requirements on sufficiently high-quality credit portfolios than does the standardised approach, this capital relief is countered by the need for larger relative cushions under the former approach.The results imply that the cushions induced by greater rating sensitivity may influence both banks' choices between proposed approaches for calculating capital requirements as well as the aggregate level of post-reform bank capital.Hence these cushions should be given due consideration in the final calibration of the Basel risk weights. Key words: new Basel Capital Accord, credit risk, internal ratings, value-at-risk
  • Vauhkonen, Jukka (2012)
    Bank of Finland. Financial market report 1
    The Ministry of Finance has set up a working group to consider how systemic risks threatening the stability of the financial system and the economy as a whole could be identified and prevented. The work is guided, for example, by the principles adopted in the Government programme and the recommendations issued by the European Systemic Risk Board on national macroprudential arrangements.
  • Vauhkonen, Jukka (2012)
    Bank of Finland. Financial market report 2
    The recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provide authorities with a high degree of discretion in the identification of domestic systemically important banks and in setting the capital buffers required of them.
  • Pylkkönen, Pertti (2006)
    Bank of Finland. Financial market report 3
    Population ageing brings financial innovation and heightened competition among banks and other financial services providers.
  • Koskela, Erkki; Stenbacka, Rune (2000)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 12/2000
    We address the question of how lending market competition, measured by the bargaining power of banks, affects the agency costs of debt finance.It is shown that intensified lending market competition will lead to lower lending rates and investment return distributions which are shifted towards lower, but less risky returns.Consequently, it follows that increased lending market competition will reduce the agency cost of debt financing.Hence, our analysis does not lend support to the commonly held view that there would be a trade-off between more intensive lending market competition and higher agency costs of debt finance.
  • Mayes, David G. (2004)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 4/2004
    Published in Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Special Issue), January 2005: 161-181
    In the light of the inequity of the way losses from bank insolvencies and their avoidance through intervention by the authorities have been distributed over creditors, depositors, owners and the population at large in transition and emerging economies, this paper explores a number of regulatory reforms that would alter the balance between seeking to avoid insolvency and lowering the costs of insolvency should it occur.In particular it considers whether a lex specialis for dealing with banks that are in trouble through prompt corrective action and if necessary resolving them if their net worth falls to zero, at little or no cost to the taxpayer can be applied in the institutional framework of transition and emerging economies. Key words: insolvency, banks, transition, emerging economies JEL classification numbers: K23, G21, O16, G28, E53
  • Herrala, Risto (2001)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 1/2001
    We sketch a theoretical framework for comparing the properties of funded LOLR schemes.We construct an idealized lender of last resort and investigate how it formulates policy under alternative public and private governance structures.The alternatives are a (first-best) social utility maximizer that can dictate participation, and three voluntary schemes: a public lender of last resort, a mutual clearing house that formulates policy by voting, and a profit maximizing private LOLR scheme.We compare the policies formulated by these institutions from the viewpoint of social desirability.Our model targets the debate on free banking, in particular the issue of whether private institutions would fare well as lenders of last resort.In our model, the first-best LOLR scheme always covers the whole banking sector and offers full insurance to the participants.We find that voluntary schemes succeed relatively well as lenders of last resort in situations where recipients of LOLR assistance can repay LOLR loans with interest.In this case, the LOLR can use interest rate policy to make the scheme attractive to banks of every quality and thus create incentives for comprehensive entry.In private schemes, policy tends to be distorted if the private scheme is the only possible scheme.However, competitive forces lead private institutions to approach the first-best outcome, which is the only contestable outcome.The end result changes when we investigate a situation in which banks' ability to repay LOLR loans is limited. When lending is associated with losses for the LOLR, good quality banks will tend to stay out of the LOLR scheme and participation in voluntary schemes will always fall short of the first-best outcome. A compulsory scheme (such as a central bank that can impose a reserve requirement on banks) has an advantage over voluntary schemes.Key words: liquidity, lender of last resort, banking, central banking, governance
  • Fantini, Marco (2003)
    BOFIT Online 2003/1
    On 18 November 2002, the Russian cabinet approved a plan to introduce deposit insurance.The introduction of deposit insurance is an essential condition for the modernisation of Russia s banking sector, and, in particular, for ending the near-monopoly of Sberbank, the State Savings Bank, in the retail segment.In this note, we compare the main features of the proposed system with its European and US equivalents.Although several important aspects of the Russian scheme have yet to be defined, our initial evaluation is positive.Concerns about the stability of the Russian banking system, however, remain
  • Financial Supervision; Rahoitustarkastus; Finansinspektionen (1995)
  • Financial Supervision; Rahoitustarkastus; Finansinspektionen (1996)
  • Financial Supervision; Rahoitustarkastus; Finansinspektionen (1997)
  • Financial Supervision; Rahoitustarkastus (1998)
  • Financial Supervision; Rahoitustarkastus (1999)
  • Financial Supervision; Rahoitustarkastus (2000)
  • Financial Supervision; Rahoitustarkastus (2001)