Browsing by Subject "patentit"

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  • Kortelainen, Mika (2007)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 9/2007
    We present a two country DGE model and estimate it using Bayesian techniques and euro area and US quarterly data for 1977 2004. In analysing the current accounts we find that a lower US rate of time preference or a higher dollar risk premium could render the deficit sustainable, but that these could push the interest rate to the zero bound. Secondly, we find that fiscal policy is not sufficiently effective to improve the current account although the zero bound is not hit. Key words: current account, zero bound, policy coordination JEL classification numbers: E61, F32
  • Funke, Michael; Yu, Hao (2009)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2009
    In this paper we analyse the impact of R&D on total factor productivity across Chinese provinces. We introduce innovations explicitly into a production function and evaluate their contribution to economic growth in 1993 - 2006. The empirical results highlight the importance and the interaction between local and external research. The evidence indicates that growth in China is not explained simply by factor input accumulation. Keywords: China, R&D, R&D Spillovers, patents, regional economic growth, semiparametric estimators JEL-Classification: C14, O47, R11, R12
  • Grönqvist, Charlotta (2009)
    Suomen Pankki. E 41
    Tiivistelmä 4 Acknowledgements 5 Introduction 9 Essay 1: The private value of patents by patent characteristics: evidence from Finland 43 Essay 2: Why does the private patent value differ by assignee? 61 Essay 3: Do the assignee's characteristics affect the private value of patents? 97 Essay 4: The optimal patent length is shorter than 18 years 131
  • Yin, Desheng; Hasan, Iftekhar; Kobeissi, Nada; Wang, Haizhi (2017)
    Innovation: Organization & Management 2
    In this study, we examine how noncompetition agreements and the mobility of human capital – a core asset of any firm – affect innovations of publicly traded firms in the United States. We find that firms in states with stricter noncompetition enforcement have fewer patent applications. We also examine patent forward citations and find that tougher enforcement of such contracts is associated with less innovative patents. Notably, we find that stronger enforcement of noncompetition agreements impedes innovation for firms facing intense industry labor mobility. High-powered, equity-based compensation positively moderates the relationship between noncompetition enforcement and innovation, but only for the quality of innovation.
  • Pekkala Kerr, Sari; Kerr, William R. (2017)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 3/2017
    We study the prevalence and traits of global collaborative patents for U.S. public companies, where the inventor team is located both within and outside of the United States. Collaborative patents are frequently observed when a corporation is entering into a new foreign region for innovative work, especially in settings where intellectual property protection is weak. We also connect collaborative patents to the ethnic composition of the firm s U.S. inventors and cross-border mobility of inventors within the firm. The inventor team composition has important consequences for how the new knowledge is exploited within and outside of the firm.
  • Akcigit, Ufuk; Kerr, William R. (2013)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 28/2013
    We study how exploration versus exploitation innovations impact economic growth through a tractable endogenous growth framework that contains multiple innovation sizes, multi-product firms, and entry/exit. Firms invest in exploration R&D to acquire new product lines and exploitation R&D to improve their existing product lines. We model and show empirically that exploration R&D does not scale as strongly with firm size as exploitation R&D. The resulting framework conforms to many regularities regarding innovation and growth differences across the firm size distribution. We also incorporate patent citations into our theoretical framework. The framework generates a simple test using patent citations that indicates that entrants and small firms have relatively higher growth spillover effects. JEL Classification: O31, O33, O41, L16 Keywords: Endogenous Growth, Innovation, Exploration, Exploitation, Research and Development, Patents, Citations, Scientists, Entrepreneurs
  • Francis, Bill; Hasan, Iftekhar; Sharma, Zenu (2011)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 17/2011
    We investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and innovation. In an empirical examination of compensation contracts of S&P 400, 500, and 600 firms we find that long-term incentives in the form of options are positively related to patents and citations to patents. In addition, convexity of options has a positive effect on innovation. We also find no relationship between pay for performance sensitivity (PPS) with patents and citations to patents while we did discover a positive relationship between these and golden parachutes. Finally, we show that subsequent to project failure managers compensation contracts are reset favourably. We provide support for the theory that compensation contracts that offer long-term commitment and protection from failure are more suitable for innovation
  • Acemoglu, Daron; Akcigit, Ufuk; Bloom, Nicholas; Kerr, William (2013)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 22/2013
    We build a model of firm-level innovation, productivity growth and reallocation featuring endogenous entry and exit. A key feature is the selection between high- and low-type firms, which differ in terms of their innovative capacity. We estimate the parameters of the model using detailed US Census micro data on firm-level output, R&D and patenting. The model provides a good t to the dynamics of firm entry and exit, output and R&D, and its implied elasticities are in the ballpark of a range of micro estimates. We find industrial policy subsidizing either the R&D or the continued operation of incumbents reduces growth and welfare. For example, a subsidy to incumbent R&D equivalent to 5% of GDP reduces welfare by about 1.5% because it deters entry of new high-type rms. On the contrary, substantial improvements (of the order of 5% improvement in welfare) are possible if the continued operation of incumbents is taxed while at the same time R&D by incumbents and new entrants is subsidized. This is because of a strong selection effect: R&D resources (skilled labor) are inefficiently used by low-type incumbent firms. Subsidies to incumbents encourage the survival and expansion of these firms at the expense of potential high-type entrants. We show that optimal policy encourages the exit of low-type firms and supports R&D by high-type incumbents and entry. JEL No. E2, L1, O31, O32 and O33 Keywords: entry, growth, industrial policy, innovation, R&D, reallocation, selection.
  • Hasan, Iftekhar; Hoi, Chun-Keung (Stan); Wu, Qiang; Zhang, Hao (2020)
    Journal of Corporate Finance June
    We find that social capital in U.S. counties, as captured by strength of social norms and density of social networks, is positively associated with innovation of firms headquartered in the county, as captured by patents and citations. This relation is robust in fixed-effect regressions, instrumental variable regressions with a Bartik instrument, propensity score matching regressions, and a difference-in-differences design that isolates the effects of over time variations in social capital due to corporate headquarter relocations. Strength of social norms plays a more dominant role than density of social networks in producing these empirical regularities. Cross-sectional evidence indicates the prominence of the contracting channel through which social capital relates to innovation. Additionally, we find that social capital is also positively associated with trademarks and effectiveness of corporate R&D expenditures.
  • Takalo, Tuomas; Hyytinen, Ari; Stevenson, Alexis (2021)
    Kansantaloudellinen aikakauskirja 3
    Tässä kirjoituksessa tehdään katsaus patenttien taloustieteellisiin arvottamismenetelmiin ja niistä johdettuihin arvioihin patenttien arvosta. Sen lisäksi raportoidaan uusia tuloksia suomalaisten yritysten (ja eräiden muiden organisaatioiden) patenttien arvosta ja verrataan niitä aiemmin Suomesta saatuihin tuloksiin. Eri arvottamismenetelmillä saadaan laadullisesti samansuuntaisia tuloksia patenttien arvojakauman muodosta ja toimialaeroista arvojen välillä. Eri menetelmät tuottavat kuitenkin erisuuruisia estimaatteja patenttien arvosta johtuen mm. eroista menetelmien vastafaktuaaleissa ja siitä, kuinka hyvin eri menetelmät pystyvät erottelemaan patenttien ja niiden suojaamien keksintöjen arvoa toisistaan. Suomalaisella aineistoilla saadut tulokset ovat samansuuntaisia kuin muista maista saadut tulokset. Tässä kirjoituksessa raportoidut uudet tulokset viittaavat siihen, että suomalaisten yritysten (ja muiden organisaatioiden) patenttien yksityinen arvo on ollut nousussa.
  • Saarenheimo, Tuomas (1994)
    Suomen Pankki. B = Bank of Finland. B 49
    1.1 On The Nature of Innovation 1.1.1 A Taxonomy for R&D 1.1.2 Uncertainty and Divisibility 1.1.3 Economic Properties of Technology 1.2 Economic Analysis of Innovation 1.2.1 History 1.2.2 Schumpeter's Hypothesis 1.2.3 Theoretical Approaches 1.3 Three Aspects of Market Structure and Innovation 1.3.1 Market Structure and the Choice of Research Strategy 1.3.2 The Propensity to Patent 1.3.3 Research Joint Ventures and Cartels or Competitive R&D? 2 The Choice of Research Strategy in a Patent Race 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Definition of Risk 2.3 The Model . 2.4 The Analysis 2.4.1 Symmetric Equilibrium . 2.4.2 Asymmetric Equilibria . 2.5 A Modification: Stochastic Payoffs 2.6 Conclusions 3 Market Structure and the Propensity to Patent: Patenting or Secrecy? 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The Basic Setup 3.3 Concentration and Patenting: Complete Information 3.3.1 Patenting Equilibrium 3.3.2 Equilibrium without Patenting 3.3.3 A Generalization: Shared Surplus 3.4 Concentration and Patenting: Incomplete Information 3.5 Firm Size and Patenting: Complete Information 3.6 Firm Size and Patenting: Incomplete Information 3.7 Conclusions 4 Research Joint Ventures vs.R&D Competition 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Model 4.3 The Analysis 4.4 Comparison of the scenarios 4.5 Conclusions
  • Kauko, Karlo (2000)
    Suomen Pankki. E 18
    The innovation activities of companies has long been a topic of interest in economics. Game theory models of oligopoly have since the start of the 1980s played a central role in the economics of innovation.In this study three game theory duopoly models are presented and each is used to analyse the firm's R&D activities. The first model is used to examine the variables that affect the incentives of banks providing payment services to develop an interbank payment system. A customer of a large bank may be in an advantageous situation in that most of his payments will be effected in that bank's internal payment system, which is more reliable and otherwise superior to the interbank system. A key result derived from the model is that provision of payment services free of charge to customers often results in a distortion of banks' incentives to develop the system. A smaller bank will overinvest in the system in order to improve its relative competitive position. Because system improvement would only weaken the large bank's superior position, it will not have a strong incentive to improve the system.Since only one of the model's two banks is investing in the quality of the system, the investments will generally not be cost-effective. If fees are charged for payment services, the distortions in incentives are less serious, even though it is often the case that both banks overinvest in the system. When model results are compared to historical situations regarding payment systems, a number of consistencies are found. The second model deals with the possibilities of a national government to influence domestic companies' investments in product development via patent laws that discriminate against foreign companies. If two countries have discriminatory patent laws in order to promote domestic companies' investments in product development, the results may well turn out to be offsetting. If just one of the two countries discriminates against foreign patent applicants, this may result in either more or less R&D effort by domestic companies, depending on the situation. The third model is used to study patenting decisions by a company that has made an innovation. A company can monopolize its innovation by either patenting it or keeping it secret. Patenting is the only viable option if a competitor independently comes up with the same innovation. A patent application, by contrast, is a public document, the contents of which are useful to others who would like to develop substitute products. Patenting is thus not advantageous unless the competitor is likely to come up with the same innovation independently. This means that a company will be the more inclined to patent an innovation, the more its rival invests in R&D. A risk-averse company is more inclined to patent than a risk-neutral one. This model is generally supported by empirical findings. Key words: innovation, oligopoly, banking, patenting
  • Kilponen, Juha; Santavirta, Torsten (2007)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 10/2007
    We show theoretically that a proportional R&D subsidy accelerates innovation activity at all degrees of competition in the modern Schumpeterian growth model, but less so at high degrees of competition. We then use company-level data on patenting activity, product market competition and R&D subsidies of Finnish firms during 1990 2001 to test the theoretical prediction. The empirical findings can be summarized as follows. Firstly, we find relatively strong evidence in favour of the inverted U-shape between competition and innovation. Secondly, we find some evidence that a direct R&D subsidy increases innovative activity at all but very high degrees of competition. This can be interpreted so mean that the R&D subsidy reinforces the Schumpeterian effect due to the negative cross-effect of R&D subsidy and competition. This is evident from the finding that an increase in the R&D subsidy steepens the inverted U relationship when competition is fierce. Keywords: competition, innovation, R&D subsidies, patents
  • Kilponen, Juha; Virén, Matti (2008)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 13/2008
    Published in Empirica, Volume 37, Number 3, July 2010, pp. 311-328
    We estimate a standard production function with a new cross-country data set on business sector production, wages and R&D investment for a selection of 14 OECD countries including the United States. The data sample covers the years 1960-2004. The data suggest that growth differences can largely be explained by capital deepening and an ability to produce new technology in the form of new patents. The importance of patents is magnified by the openness of the economy. We find some evidence of increasing elasticity of substitution over time, all though the results are sensitive to assumptions on the nature of technological progress. Keywords: growth, R&D, production function, patents JEL classification numbers: O40, E10, O43