Browsing by Subject "peliteoria"

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  • Kauko, Karlo (1998)
    Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 28/1998
    In this paper a game theoretic duopoly model is developed to analyse the development of an interbank payment system.There are two competing banks in the model, and payment services offered to the public are among their main products.The customer of the larger bank uses mainly intrabank payment services; these services are assumed to be of high quality.This creates a so-called network externality, meaning that many customers prefer to use the large bank for quality reasons.The development of interbank payment systems reduces the significance of this factor and hence benefits the small bank.A big bank has a sufficient incentive to develop the system only if a fee is charged for using payment systems.The role for public investment depends critically on the pricing of payment services.If banks offer payment services free of charge, their incentives to develop the system are strongly biased, and it would be efficient for the central bank to have an active role in developing the system.If instead payment services are directly priced, eventual distortions are much less serious, and the role of the central bank need not be as prominent. JEL Classification Numbers: G18, G21, L13 Keywords: banks, payments systems, network externality, duopoly
  • Sörensen, Peter Birch (1990)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 4/1990
    This paper surveys the theory ofinternational tax coordination. The first part of the paper discusses the optimal method of international double taxation relief from an equity and efficiency perspective. The second part surveys the modern game-theoretic approach to tax coordination, stressing the potential welfare gains from international cooperation in the field of tax policy. Finally, the third part of the paper reviews the theory of international coordination of indirect taxation.
  • Barnett, Alina; Ellison, Martin (2012)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 10/2012
    Disinflationary episodes are a valuable source of information for economic agents trying to learn about the economy. In this paper we are particularly interested in how policymakers can themselves learn by disinflating. The approach differs from the existing literature, which typically focuses on the learning of private agents during a disinflation. We build a model where both the policymaker and private agents learn, and ask what happens if the policymaker has to disinflate to satisfy a new central bank mandate specifying greater emphasis on inflation stabilisation. In this case, our results show that inflation may fall dramatically before it gradually rises to its new long run level. The potential for inflation to undershoot its long run level during a disinflationary episode suggests that caution should be exercised when assessing the success of any change in the policymaker's mandate. JEL classification: D83, E52, E58 Keywords: Disinflation, Escape Dynamics, Learning, Monetary Policy