Browsing by Subject "riskinotto"

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  • Li, Xiaoming; Liu, Zheng; Peng, Yuchao; Xu, Zhiwei (2021)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/2021
    We study the impact of China’s 2013 implementation of Basel III on bank risk-taking and its responses to monetary policy shocks using confidential loan-level data from a large Chinese bank. Guided by theory, we use a difference-in-difference identification, exploiting cross-sectional differences in lending behaviors between high-risk and low-risk bank branches before and after the new regulations. We find that, through a risk-weighting channel, changes in regulations significantly reduced bank risk-taking, both on average and conditional on monetary policy easing. However, banks reduce risk-taking by increasing lending to ostensibly low-risk state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under government guarantees, despite their low average productivity.
  • Karas, Alexei; Pyle, William; Schoors, Koen (2019)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2019
    Using evidence from Russia, we explore the effect of the introduction of deposit insurance on bank risk. Drawing on within-bank variation in the ratio of firm deposits to total household and firm deposits, so as to capture the magnitude of the decrease in market discipline after the introduction of deposit insurance, we demonstrate for private, domestic banks that larger declines in market discipline generate larger increases in traditional measures of risk. These results hold in a difference-in-difference setting in which state and foreign-owned banks, whose deposit insurance regime does not change, serve as a control.
  • Mäkinen, Mikko (2021)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 8/2021
    Can a major financial crisis trigger changes in a bank’s risk-taking behavior? Using the 2008 Global Financial Crisis as a quasi-natural experiment and a difference-in-differences approach, I examine whether the worst crisis-hit Russian banks – the banks that have strong incentives to behavior-altering changes – can decrease their post-crisis exposure to risk. A shift in risk-taking behavior by these banks indicates the learning hypothesis. The findings are mixed. The evidence concerning credit risk is inconsistent with the learning hypothesis. On the other hand, the evidence concerning solvency risk is consistent with the learning hypothesis and corroborates evidence from the Nordic countries (Berglund and Mäkinen, 2019). As such, bank learning from a financial crisis may not depend on the institutional context and the level of development of national financial market. Several robustness checks with alternative regression specifications are provided.
  • Hong, Claire Yurong; Lu, Xiaomeng; Pan, Jun (2021)
    BOFIT Discussion Papers 14/2021
    Using a unique FinTech data containing monthly individual-level consumption, investments, and payments, we examine how FinTech can lower investment barriers and improve risk-taking. Seizing on the rapid expansion of offline usages of Alipay in China, we measure individuals’ FinTech adoption by the speed and intensity with which they adopt the new technology. Our hypothesis is that individuals with high FinTech adoption, through repeated usages of the Alipay app, would build familiarity and trust, reducing the psychological barriers against investing in risky assets. Measuring risk-taking by individuals’ mutual-fund investments on the FinTech platform, we find that higher FinTech adoption results in higher participation and more risk-taking. Using the distance to Hangzhou as an instrument variable to capture the exogenous variation in FinTech adoption yields results of similar economic and statistical significance. Focusing on the welfare-improving aspect of FinTech inclusion, we find that individuals with high risk tolerance, hence more risk-taking capacity, and those living in under-banked cities stand to benefit more from the advent of FinTech.
  • Lucchetta, Marcella; Moretto, Michele; Parigi, Bruno M. (2018)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 2/2018
    We show that the impact of government bailouts (liquidity injections) on a representative bank’s risk taking depends on the level of systematic risk of its loans portfolio. In a model where bank’s output follows a geometric Brownian motion and the government guarantees bank’s liabilities, we show first that more generous bailouts may or may not induce banks to take on more risk depending on the level of systematic risk; if systematic risk is high (low), a more generous bailout decreases (increases) bank’s risk taking. Second, the optimal liquidity policy itself depends on systematic risk. Third, the relationship between bailouts and bank’s risk taking is not monotonic. When systematic risk is low, the optimal liquidity policy is loose and more generous bailouts induce banks to take on more risk. If systematic risk is high and the optimal liquidity policy is tight, less generous bailouts induce banks to take on less risk. However, when high systematic risk makes a very tight liquidity policy optimal, a less generous bailout could increase bank’s risk taking. While in this model there is only one representative bank, in an economy with many banks, a higher level of systematic risk could also be a source of systemic risk if a tighter liquidity policy induces correlated risk taking choices by banks.