Browsing by Subject "riskirahoitus"

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  • Vauhkonen, Jukka (2004)
    Suomen Pankki. E 30
    This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four essays on financial contracting theory.In the first essay, we argue that many adverse selection models of standard one-period loan contracts are not robust to changes in market structure.We argue that debt is not an optimal contract in these models, if there is only one (monopoly) financier instead of a large number of competitive financiers. In the second essay, we examine the welfare effects of allowing banks to hold equity in their borrowing firms.According to the agency cost literature, banks equity stakes in their borrowing firms would seem to alleviate firms asset substitution moral hazard problem associated with debt financing.We argue that this alleged benefit of banks equity holding is small or non-existent when banks are explicitly modelled as active monitors and firms have access also to market finance. In the third essay, we extend the well-known incomplete contracting model of Aghion and Bolton to attempt to explain the empirical observation that the allocation of control rights between entrepreneur and venture capitalist is often contingent in the following way.If the company s performance (eg earnings before taxes and interest) is bad, the venture capital firm obtains full control of the company.If company performance is medium, the entrepreneur retains or obtains more control rights.If company performance is good, the venture capitalist relinquishes most of his control rights. The fourth essay is a short note, in which we show that the main result of the model of Aghion and Bolton concerning optimality properties of contingent control allocations in an incomplete contracting environment holds only if an additional condition is satisfied. Key words: financial contracts, security design, capital structure, incomplete contracts
  • Pylkkönen, Pertti (2005)
    Bank of Finland. Financial market report 4
    Venture capital investments in Finland totalled EUR 369 million in 2004. Relative to GDP, these investments fell below the European average in 2004.
  • Kanniainen, Vesa; Leppämäki, Mikko (2002)
    Bank of Finland. Discussion papers 5/2002
    The paper shows that uninformed finance gives rise to excessive entry, both in human-capital-intensive and in conventional industries when the financial institutions cannot identify the entrepreneurial talent.Introduction of informed capital (eg venture capital finance) with superior screening ability results in an institutional equilibrium with efficiency gains in human-capital industries.Contrary to received wisdom, the institutional equilibrium with informed capital is characterised by more limited entry to an industry, which requires highly talented human capital. Unexpectedly, the total welfare effect is ambiguous, as the allocation of non-informed capital is now less efficient in the conventional industry.The institutional equilibrium is shaped by investors' risk preferences, costs of establishing uninformed and informed capital, and the initial distribution ot talent in the economy. Key words: allocation of talent, asymmetric information, financial institutions, venture capital, institutional equilibrium JEL classification numbers: D82, G2, G24
  • Heiskanen, Hanna (2017)
    Finanssivalvonta. Blogi 22.11.2017
  • Bozkaya, Ant; Kerr, William R. (2013)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 30/2013
    Published in Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Volume 23, Issue 4, 1 December 2014: 776-810
    European nations substitute between employment protection regulations and labor market expenditures (e.g., unemployment insurance benefits) for providing worker insurance. Employment regulations more directly tax firms making frequent labor adjustments than other labor market insurance mechanisms. Venture capital investors are especially sensitive to these labor adjustment costs. Nations favoring labor market expenditures as the mechanism for providing worker insurance developed stronger venture capital markets over 1990-2008, especially in high volatility sectors. In this context, policy mechanisms are more important than the overall level of worker insurance. JEL Classification: G24, J21, J65, L26, M13, O31, O32, O52. Key Words: employment protection regulations, dismissal costs, unemployment insurance benefits, private equity, venture capital, entrepreneurship.
  • Pylkkönen, Pertti (2004)
    Suomen Pankki. Rahoitusmarkkinaraportti 3
    Vuonna 2003 Suomessa tehtiin riskipääomasijoituksia 328 miljoonan euron arvosta. BKT:seen suhteutettuna Suomessa tehdyt riskipääomasijoitukset olivat Euroopan kolmanneksi suurimmat, edellä olivat vain Iso-Britannia ja Ruotsi.
  • Pylkkönen, Pertti (2003)
    Suomen Pankki. Rahoitusmarkkinaraportti Syksy
    Riskipääomasijoituksiin kerättyjen varojen määrä on supistunut Euroopassa kahden vuoden aikana huomattavasti. Aikaisemmin kerättyjen varojen ansiosta sijoitusten määrä nousi kuitenkin viime vuonna Euroopassa lähes 14 prosenttia.
  • Salo, Anni (2012)
    Suomen Pankki. Rahoitusmarkkinaraportti 1
    Innovaatioiden ja uuden teknologian luojina, käyttöönottajina ja levittäjinä ns. start-up-yritysten merkitys taloudellisen kasvun kannalta on kiistaton. Näitä yrityksiä rahoittavat riskirahoittajat ovat erikoistuneet innovatiivisimpien ja lupaavimpien liikeideoiden löytämiseen ja kehittämiseen.
  • Pylkkönen, Pertti (2005)
    Suomen Pankki. Rahoitusmarkkinaraportti 4
    Vuonna 2004 Suomessa tehtiin riskipääomasijoituksia 369 miljoonan euron arvosta. Bruttokansantuotteeseen suhteutettuna Suomessa tehdyt riskipääomasijoitukset jäivät viime vuonna alle Euroopan keskitason.
  • Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka; Takalo, Tuomas; Kultti, Klaus (2006)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 1/2006
    Published in Finnish Economic Papers, Volume 20, No. 2, 2007, Pages 91-107
    This paper studies how comparing can be used to provide information in financial markets in the presence of a hidden characteristics problem.Although an investor cannot precisely estimate the future returns of an entrepreneur's projects, the investor can mitigate the asymmetric information problem by ranking different entrepreneurs and financing only the very best ones.Information asymmetry can be eliminated with certainty if the number of compared projects is sufficiently large.Because comparing favours centralised information gathering, it creates a novel rationale for the establishment of a financial intermediary.Key words: asymmetric information, banking, corporate finance, financial intermediation, ranking, venture capital JEL classification numbers: G21, G24
  • Pylkkönen, Pertti (2004)
    Bank of Finland. Financial market report 3
    In 2003, venture capital investment in Finland amounted to EUR 328 million. In fact, relative to GDP, Finland's venture capital investment was the third highest in Europe, preceded only by the UK and Sweden.
  • Salo, Anni (2012)
    Bank of Finland. Financial market report 1
    As creators, introducers and distributors of innovations and new technologies, the importance of start-up companies for economic growth is indisputable. Venture capitalists that finance these companies specialise in finding and developing the most innovative and promising business ideas.