Browsing by Subject "uncertainty"

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  • Bank of Finland (2021)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 3/2021
    The COVID-19 pandemic will ease due to the vaccination programme, and as a consequence the Finnish economy will start to grow at a brisk pace. As the COVID restrictions end and uncertainty decreases, households will be able to consume more freely. With economic growth also strong globally, this will give a fillip to Finland’s foreign trade. The pandemic is, however, not yet finally over. There is still the threat that it could worsen again, and this casts a shadow over both the growth outlook for Finland and that for the global economy as a whole. The Finnish economy will grow 2.9% in 2021 and 3.0% in 2022. The rapid growth will, however, be temporary, and the pace will slow to 1.3% already in 2023.
  • Ambrocio, Gene (2021)
    Applied Economics Letters 9
    I study the effects of expected and realized uncertainty on Euro area macroeconomic conditions. I use a range of expected and realized uncertainty measures including those based on survey forecasts and find that the effects of expected uncertainty vanish once realized uncertainty is accounted for when using financial or news media-based measures. On the other hand, shocks to a survey-based measure of expected uncertainty do appear to have dampening effects.
  • Bank of Finland (2021)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 3/2021
    Economic growth will gather pace across the board as the pandemic eases. Strong consumer confidence, together with the release of pent-up demand, will support household consumption. Finnish exports will rapidly rise back towards pre-pandemic levels as export markets revive, with investments also supporting economic growth. The Finnish economy will grow 2.9% in 2021 and 3.0% in 2022. This fast pace of growth will, however, be only temporary, and in 2023, GDP growth will slow to 1.3%, reflecting the lacklustre longer-term growth prospects of an ageing economy.
  • Ambrocio, Gene (2020)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 5/2020
    I construct a novel measure of household uncertainty based on survey data for European countries. I show that household uncertainty shocks are not universally like negative demand shocks. Notably, household uncertainty shocks are largely inflationary in Europe. These results lend support to a pricing bias mechanism as an important transmission channel. A comparison of results across countries suggest that demographics and factors related to average markups along with monetary policy play a role in the transmission of household uncertainty to inflation. I develop an Overlapping Generations New Keynesian model with Deep Habits to rationalize these results.
  • Lindblad, Annika; Sariola, Mikko; Silvo, Aino (2020)
    Bank of Finland. Bulletin 5/2019
    Global uncertainty is weakening growth in business fixed investment in Finland, and its impacts may be felt with a lag. Cyclical fluctuations caused by the uncertainty, however, conceal domestic, structural factors that have weakened investment throughout the 2000s. These factors include weak productivity growth, population ageing and structural changes in the economy towards a services economy. Productivity, in particular, can be influenced by many economic policy measures. Of these measures, innovation policy, for example, plays an important role.
  • Ambrocio, Gene (2019)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 17/2019
    I provide a measure of household uncertainty available for European Union (EU) countries. The measure draws from the same consumer survey data used to construct widely-used consumer sentiment indices. I find that increases in household uncertainty are followed by declines in consumer sentiment and household financial conditions. Using Euro Area-wide indices, I also find that the effects of increases in household uncertainty differ from increases in uncertainty from other sources such as financial markets and economic policy. Notably, household uncertainty shocks are inflationary. These results challenge the notion that (household) uncertainty shocks act like negative demand shocks.
  • Laakkonen, Helinä (2015)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 4/2015
    This paper studies the impact of uncertainty on the investors' reactions to news on macroeconomic statistics. With daily data on realized volatility and trading volume, we show that the investors in the US Treasury bond futures market react significantly stronger to US macroeconomic news in times of low macroeconomic, financial and political uncertainty. We also find that investors are more sensitive to the uncertainty in the financial market compared to the macroeconomic and political uncertainties. Our results might partly explain the sudden freeze and low liquidity in some financial markets during the latest financial crisis.
  • Ambrocio, Gene (2017)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 37/2017
    This study provides estimates of the real effects of macro-uncertainty de- composed into fundamental and overconfidence bias components. Crucially, overconfidence biases lower ex-ante measures of uncertainty, while fundamen- tal uncertainty raises both ex-ante and ex-post measures. This distinction is useful since the estimates on the real effects of the overconfidence component of uncertainty mitigate endogeneity concerns. I first document evidence for overconfidence biases from survey density forecasts in the US survey of pro- fessional forecasters. Then, using a sign and zero restrictions identification scheme in a vector autoregression (VAR), I find that increases in fundamental uncertainty and declines in overconfidence tend to lower real activity.
  • Buchanan, Bonnie; Cao, Xuying (Cathy); Liljeblom, Eva; Weihrich, Susan (2016)
    Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 11/2016
    Published in Journal of Corporate Finance 2017 ; 42 ; February ; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.11.008
    We examine how firms respond to uncertainty around U.S. tax policy changes, namely the individual level tax rate increases set to take effect on January 1, 2011 and January 1, 2013. We provide evidence that firms time the uncertainty in the tax environment and revise their dividend policy to an expected tax increase. We find that firms are likely to initiate their dividends or intensively increase their existing dividend amount one year before the expected tax increase. In addition, in 2012 when there is much less uncertainty on dividend tax changes than in 2010, firms are less likely to initiate a regular dividend but are more likely to initiate special dividends. The results suggest that firms facing less tax uncertainty are less likely to make long-term commitments on regular dividend payments but are more likely to take advantage of the last-minute low tax benefits by issuing special dividends. Furthermore, the response to the possible elimination of a tax cut was strongest in firms with high levels of tax-affected ownership, supporting the argument that when facing policy uncertainty, firms behave to prepare for the worst scenarios from the viewpoint of the shareholders, which in this case is a tax increase.