Financial contracts and contingent control rights

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dc.contributor Suomen Pankki Vauhkonen, Jukka 2014-09-22T07:58:08Z 2014-09-22T07:58:08Z 2003
dc.identifier.isbn 952-462-061-8
dc.identifier.issn 0785-3572
dc.description.abstract According to empirical studies of venture capital finance, the division of control rights between entrepreneur and venture capitalists is often contingent on certain measures of firm performance.If the indicator of the company's performance (eg earnings before taxes and interest) is low, the venture capital firm obtains full control of the company.If company performance improves, the entrepreneur retains or obtains more control rights. If company performance is very good, the venture capitalist relinquishes most of his control rights.In this article, we extend the incomplete contracting model of Aghion and Bolton to construct a theoretical model that is consistent with these empirical findings. Key words: incomplete contracts, financial contracting, contingent contracts, control rights, joint ownership JEL classification numbers: G32
dc.format.extent 33 s.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers
dc.subject mallit
dc.subject sopimukset
dc.subject yritykset
dc.subject päätöksenteko
dc.subject yrittäjät
dc.subject kannattavuus
dc.subject sijoittajat
dc.subject SP
dc.subject päätösvalta
dc.title Financial contracts and contingent control rights
dc.type Sarjajulkaisu
dc.identifier.urn URN:NBN:fi:bof-20140807299
dc.subject.jel G32 Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita
dc.series.year 2003
dc.series.number 14/2003
dc.series.sortingnumber 14 13.5.2003

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