Information acquisition during a Dutch auction

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Title: Information acquisition during a Dutch auction
ISBN: 978-952-462-791-7
Author: Miettinen, Paavo
Organization: Bank of Finland
Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers
ISSN: 1456-6184
Series year: 2012
Series number: 8/2012
Year of publication: 2012
Publication date: 14.2.2012
Published in: Published in Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 148, Issue 3, May 2013, Pages 1213-1225
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.018
Pages: 24 s.
Keywords: menetelmät; huutokaupat; informaatio; hinnat; mallit;
Abstract: In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction when the bidders that are uninformed of their valuations with probability q and can acquire information about their valuation with a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in the setting where bidders are ex ante symmetric and have independent private values. We show that when the number of bidders is large the Dutch auction produces more revenue than the first price auction.
Note: lmestynyt myös Journal of Economic Theory 2013 sekä Bank of Finland research discussion papers 7/2010.
Rights: https://helda.helsinki.fi/bof/copyright


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