Optimal bank transparency

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dc.contributor Bank of Finland
dc.contributor.author Moreno, Diego
dc.contributor.author Takalo, Tuomas
dc.date.accessioned 2014-09-22T07:58:43Z
dc.date.available 2014-09-22T07:58:43Z
dc.date.issued 2012
dc.identifier.isbn 978-952-462-792-4
dc.identifier.issn 1456-6184
dc.identifier.uri https://helda.helsinki.fi/bof/handle/123456789/7745
dc.description.abstract Consider a competitive bank whose illiquid asset portfolio is funded by short-term debt that needs to be refinanced before the asset matures. In this setting, we show that maximal transparency is not socially optimal, and that the existence of social externalities of bank failures reduces further the optimal level of transparency. Moreover, asset risk taking decreases as the level of transparency decreases towards the socially optimal level. As for the sign of the impact of transparency on refinancing risk, it is negative given the asset´s risk, but it is ambiguous if we account for its indirect effect via risk taking.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.rights https://helda.helsinki.fi/bof/copyright
dc.subject pankkitoiminta
dc.subject avoimuus
dc.subject riskit
dc.subject SP
dc.subject RP
dc.title Optimal bank transparency
dc.type Sarjajulkaisu
dc.identifier.urn URN:NBN:fi:bof-20140807505
dc.series.name Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers
dc.series.year 2012
dc.series.number 9/2012
dc.series.sortingnumber 0009
dc.date.publication 24.2.2012
dc.description.publication Published in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 48 ; 1 ; February ; 203-231 ; http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12295

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