Why do bank runs look like panic? : a new explanation

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Title: Why do bank runs look like panic? : a new explanation
ISBN: 952-462-302-1
Author: Chen, Yehning ; Hasan, Iftekhar
Organization: Suomen Pankki
Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers
ISSN: 0785-3572
Series year: 2006
Series number: 19/2006
Year of publication: 2006
Publication date: 1.7.2006
Published in: Published in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Volume 40, Issue 2-3 , March/April 2008, Pages 535-546
Pages: 20 s.
Keywords: pankkikriisit; pankkitoiminta; häiriöt; talletukset; talletuspaot; paniikit;
JEL: G21; G28
Abstract: This paper demonstrates that, even if depositors are fully rational and always choose the Pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria, a bank run may still occur when depositors' expectations of the bank's fundamentals do not change.More specifically, a bank run may occur when depositors learn that noisy bank-specific information is revealed, or when they learn that precise bank-specific information is not revealed.The results in this paper are consistent with empirical evidence about bank runs. It also implies that suspension of convertibility can improve the efficiency of bank runs. Key words: bank run, banking panic, suspension of convertibility JEL classification numbers: G21, G28
Note: Ilmestynyt myös Journal of money credit and banking 2008 ; 40 ; 2-3.
Rights: https://helda.helsinki.fi/bof/copyright

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