Bank supervision Russian style : rules versus enforcement and tacit objectives

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Title: Bank supervision Russian style : rules versus enforcement and tacit objectives
Author: Claeys, Sophie ; Lanine, Gleb ; Schoors, Koen
Organization: Bank of Finland
Department / Unit: Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)
Series: BOFIT Discussion Papers
Series number: 10/2005
Year of publication: 2005
Publication date: 14.8.2005
Published in: Published in Journal of Comparative Economics, September 2007, Vol. 35, No. 3, p. 630-657 and University of Michigan ; The William Davidson Institute 2005 ; 778.
Pages: 54 s.
Keywords: sääntely; pankkitoiminta; valvonta; pankkikriisit; Venäjä; vakaus; rahoitusmarkkinat; keskuspankit; Bofit-kokoelma; pankkilisenssit;
Abstract: We focus on the con.ict between two central bank objectives individual bank stability and systemic stability.We study the licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) during 1999.2002.Banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined adequately, and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy protection from license withdrawal, which suggests a tacit concern for systemic stability.The CBR is also found reluctant to with- draw licenses from banks that violate the individual's deposits-to-capital ratio as this conflicts with the tacit CBR objective to secure depositor confidence and systemic stability.Keywords: Bank supervision, bank crisis, Russia.JEL Classification : G2 N2 E5
Rights: https://helda.helsinki.fi/bof/copyright


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