Political connections and depositor discipline

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Titel: Political connections and depositor discipline
Författare: Disli, Mustafa ; Schoors, Koen ; Meir, Jos
Institution: Bank of Finland
Avdelning / Enhet: Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)
Serie: BOFIT Discussion Papers
Serienumber: 6/2013
Utgivningsår: 2013
Utgivningsdatum: 23.4.2013
Publicerad i: Published in Journal of Financial Stability, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2013, Pages 804–819
Sidor: 42 s.
Nyckelord: Turkki; politiikka; vaikutukset; talletukset; pankkitoiminta; talletussuoja; Bofit-kokoelma
Abstrakt: We examine the effects of political connections on depositor discipline in a sample of Turkish banks. Banks with former members of parliament at the helm enjoy reduced depositor discipline, especially if the former politician's party is currently in power - less so if the former politician served as a minister. Banks with structural problems are more likely to appoint former politicians, but our results remain robust after controlling for selection effects. Ministers may reduce depositor discipline less because they signal severe problems and because the additional government deposits they bring to the bank during their term tend to leave with them. Keywords: Depositor discipline, political connections, banks JEL: G1, G2, D7
Licens: https://helda.helsinki.fi/bof/copyright


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