China as a regulatory state

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dc.contributor Bank of Finland Du, Julan Lu, Yi Tao, Zhigang 2014-09-22T08:00:30Z 2014-09-22T08:00:30Z 2009
dc.identifier.isbn 978-952- 462- 989- 8
dc.identifier.issn 1456-5889
dc.description.abstract Market economy models differ in the degree of the power of the government vis-à-vis the market in the economy. Under the classications set forth by Glaeser and Shleifer (2002, 2003), and Djankov et al. (2003), these market models range from those emphasizing low government intervention in the market (private orderings and private litigation through courts) to those where the state is an active participant (regulatory state). This paper, using data from a survey of 3,073 private enterprises in China, constructs an index to quantify the power of the government vis-à-vis the market. Regional government power is found to vary considerably across China's regions. Notably, enterprises located in regions where government exerts more power in the market perform better, suggesting that the regulatory state model of the market economy is appropriate for China.
dc.format.extent 40 s.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.subject Kiina
dc.subject talousuudistus
dc.subject markkinatalous
dc.subject sääntely
dc.subject yritykset
dc.subject alueet
dc.subject SP
dc.subject RP
dc.subject RP ST
dc.subject Bofit-kokoelma
dc.title China as a regulatory state
dc.type Sarjajulkaisu
dc.identifier.urn URN:NBN:fi:bof-201408071931 BOFIT Discussion Papers
dc.series.year 2009
dc.series.number 17/2009
dc.series.sortingnumber 17 10.10.2009
dc.contributor.orgunit Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)

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