Browsing by Subject "Aristotle"

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  • Tahko, Tuomas E.; Sirkel, Riin (Tartu University Press, 2014)
    Studia philosophica estonica
    This special issue centers around Aristotelian metaphysics, construed broadly to cover both scholarly research on Aristotle’s metaphysics, as well as work by contemporary metaphysicians on Aristotelian themes. It focuses on two themes in Aristotelian metaphysics, namely essence and grounding, and their connections. A variety of related questions regarding dependence, priority, fundamentality, explanation, causation, substance, and modality also receive attention.
  • Elo, Mika (2012)
    The article reflects on digitality and interface design in terms of the multiple senses of touch. Touching is presented as a ‘‘pathic’’ sense of being exposed, which implies that touching exceeds the tactile and even the phenomenal world. A particular focus is set on Aristotle’s and Husserl’s ways of thematizing the sense of touch. In this way, two extremes of the phenomenological thinking of touching are articulated: touching as an indistinct and heterogeneous constituent of sensitivity and touching as the guarantor of immediacy of the sense experience. Referring to Derrida’s critical notes concerning haptocentrism, the article attempts to problematize the hand and the finger as phenomenological figures of touch and as holds of haptic realism. The article concludes that insofar as digital interface design aims at haptic realism it conceives of the sense of touch in terms of narcissistic feedback and thus tends to conceal the pathic moment of touching.
  • Backman, Jussi (2005)
    The paper discusses Heidegger’s early notion of the “movedness of life” (Lebensbewegtheit) and its intimate connection with Aristotle’s concept of movement (kinesis). Heidegger’s aim in the period of Being and Time was to “overcome” the Greek ideal of being as ousia – constant and complete presence and availability – by showing that the background for all meaningful presence is Dasein, the ecstatically temporal context of human being. Life as the event of finitude is characterized by an essential lack and incompleteness, and the living present therefore gains meaning only in relation to a horizon of un-presence and un-availability. Whereas the “theological” culmination of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics finds the supreme fulfillment of human life in the semi-divine self-immanence and self-sufficiency of the bios theoretikos, a radical Heideggerian interpretation of kinesis may permit us to find in Aristotle the fundamental structures of mortal living as self-transcendent movement.
  • Backman, Jussi (2012)
    Derrida's deconstructive strategy of reading texts can be understood as a way of highlighting the irreducible plurality of discursive meaning that undermines the traditional Western “logocentric“ desire for an absolute point of reference. While his notion of logocentrism was modeled on Heidegger's articulation of the traditional ontotheological framework of Aristotelian metaphysics, Derrida detects a logocentric remnant in Heidegger's own interpretation of gathering (Versammlung) as the basic movement of λόγος, discursiveness. However, I suggest that Derrida here touches upon a certain limit of deconstruction. As Derrida himself points out, the “decentering“ effect of deconstruction does not simply abolish the unifying and focalizing function of discourse. Insofar as deconstruction involves reading and interpreting, it cannot completely evade narrative focalization. Rather, both Heidegger and Derrida can be understood as addressing the radical contextuality of all discursive centers and focal points as well as the consequent impossibility of an ultimate and definitive metanarrative.
  • Backman, Jussi (Eurooppalaisen filosofian seura, 2006)
    23°45: niin & näin -lehden kirjasarja
  • Backman, Jussi (Eurooppalaisen filosofian seura, 2005)
    23°45 : Niin & näin -lehden filosofinen julkaisusarja
    Mitä oleva on? Omaisuus ja elämä pureutuu tähän filosofian peruskysymykseen seuraten kahta länsimaisen filosofian jättiläistä, Aristotelestä ja Heideggeria. Siinä missä Aristoteles kysyy olevaa substantiivina ja tilana, etsii Heidegger olemisen mieltä verbinä ja tapahtumana. Nämä kaksi merkitystä löytyvät myös suomen olla-verbistä: "omistaa jotakin" ja "olla olemassa, elossa". Omaisuus ja elämä antavat peruslähtökohdat olevan tulkitsemiselle. Kirja vie lukijansa filosofian kreikkalaisille juurille ja sen uusimpiin, Heideggerin avaamiin mahdollisuuksiin.
  • Backman, Jussi (Jyväskylän yliopisto, 2012)
    SoPhi
  • Leinonen, Mika Tapani (Helsingin yliopisto, 2021)
    The topic of this work is Aristotle’s doctrine of the intellect (ὁ νοῦς) as the noetic faculty of the soul in the psychology of the De anima. The work is based on scholarly exegesis of Aristotle’s text and philosophical analysis of his arguments. This work also reviews some of the most prominent interpretations of the topic up to the present. While most research on the topic seems to have focused primarily on ontological issues, the aim of this work is to assess the question of what kind of an activity Aristotle ascribes to the intellect as a faculty of the soul. To this end, I separate between two forms of rationality in Aristotle’s psychology, noetic and discursive rationalities. Close reading of Aristotle’s considerations of rational capabilities in the De anima shows that he separates between these, and furthermore that the characteristic activity of the intellect (νοεῖν) is best understood in terms of the former. I also discuss the method of defining capacities in Aristotle’s faculty psychology and give reasons for thinking that the doctrine of the intellect stands for a higher, separate reality in Aristotle’s psychology and is not contained in the common account of the soul. In approaching the topic of the intellect, I discuss the way that Aristotle aims to overcome the shortcoming of Anaxagoras’ theory with his doctrine of the potential (δύναμις) intellect. The central account of the intellect’s noetic activity in the De anima is given in terms of receptivity (δεκτικός) and is borne out of an analogy with sense perception. The analogy implies an explanation of the intellect’s activity with the model of efficient cause. But Aristotle’s considerations of the nature of the intellect also show him detaching it from the faculty of sense due its difference in scope, discussed in terms of limitlessness or neutrality of the intellect. In this work I argue that the characterizations that Aristotle gives of the intellect’s characteristic activity prevents from reading it as thinking in the broad sense of the term. However, it is possible to take Aristotle’s focus to be with thinking in his account of the intellect. In this work my aim is to give reasons for why this reading is unsuccessful and to provide an alternative, which argues that the cognitive activity of the intellect in the De anima is rather best understood by associating it with theoretical knowledge. In my reading the activity of the intellect does not stand for ordinary thought but for the most successful form of rationality available to humans, which is a veridical and direct kind of cognition that is of starting points of explanatory sciences. The activity of the intellect is primarily for Aristotle reception of form (εἶδος), as is shown by his characterization ‘place of forms’. In conformity with the traditional reading of Alexander of Aphrodisias, the noetic faculty of the soul is in my reading never the actual locus of forms but only the dispositional capacify for participating in the life of active understanding.