Browsing by Subject "ECB"

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  • Staniloae, Anamaria (Helsingfors universitet, 2017)
    The idea of researching transparency in the European Central Bank came during one course on European Monetary Union – a legal, economic and historical approach when a debate on how transparent or not transparent European Central Bank in its communications during the crisis. The discussion started from the announcement of the OMT Program; which is rather short and brief. In the previous years before the crisis, the European Central Bank had been recognized in several research studies as one of the most transparent banks in the world; but transparency does not have only one definition and there is no agreement in the research field about it. No study, so far has taken into consideration analyzing transparency based on the organizational set up and the legal framework. The definition of transparency and how the term is used in a social context, combining theoretical and practical sides of the term and offering insights on the understanding of the organization regarding transparency and its limits. The result of the research is that transparency appears briefly in the legal framework, as well in the organizational set up of the ECB, like a characteristic that is acknowledged and must be improved and, in the same time, as a tool for improving the communication between the public organization and the citizens to increase the democratic deficiency. The definition of transparency is related with elements of the ECB organizational set-up like primary objective, tasks, reports and access to documents. The primary objective and tasks can be easily identified in the mission of the ECB, but the communication strategy is dispersed as the ECB main duty is to publish reports regarding its activities, but communicating the decisions it is up to the Governing Council. Last but not least, the access to documents is strictly described in terms of when access is denied and what is considered citizens’ interest. These rules have been conducting the behavior of the ECB when announcing the OMT Program and their behavior through the entire time. In the context of the economic crisis, the OMT Program is a changing element that transformed the ECB way of communicating in a more efficient way and emphasizing that what and how communicates it is important as adapting the style to the audience.
  • Tuori, Klaus (Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, 2013)
    COLLeGIUM: Studies across Disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences 14
    The financial crisis has put many of the European actors in situations where they have been able or even forced to take new roles. The constitutional issues involved have mostly been tackled at a relatively superficial level if at all and only by experts. Most of the actions that have created new roles have been based on more or less ad hoc decisions. It is already visible that while many of these decisions have not resulted in their intended consequences they have had a broad list of unintended and unforeseen consequences. In this paper, I will concentrate on the European Central Bank (hereafter ECB when referring to either the ECB or the ESCB as it is the decision-making body for both). It is naturally only part of the complex financial and institutional set-up involved in the financial crisis. However, it is also one of the clearest examples of the constitutional drift in roles and also a potentially unfortunate example of the unintended constitutional and other consequences of these ad hoc decisions. I will first discuss the original intended constitutional position of the ECB as defined by the constitutional principles of the economic and monetary union. Second, I will discuss the three potential roles of administrative bodies: expert, stakeholder and politician. I devote some special attention to the demarcation lines between the roles before turning to the new roles of the ECB. Finally, I will discuss these new roles from the constitutional law and control perspectives. It should not come as a surprise that constitutional control mechanisms envisaged for a limited expert role are hardly sufficient for the roles of a stakeholder or a politician. This also has implications for the democratic legitimacy of the institutions involved, the issue with which I will end my paper. In order to avoid misunderstandings, I am not proposing some specific model for the common central bank nor am I claiming that the current model is value free and based on purely scientific rationales. It clearly is not. However, discussions of the economic and political rationales and merits of various central banking models are totally outside the scope of this paper. I am simply taking the constitutionally stipulated model as given and trying to assess what kind of roles it equipped the central bank with from the point of view of constitutional control and legitimacy. To the extent that these roles are not deemed sufficient, the main route to remedy the situation should be Treaty changes.