This study analyses one of the most prominent instrument of mutual recognition, the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). The surrender mechanism of EAW is meant to replace the system of extradition based on a complex network of international conventions and bilateral treaties, which has governed the relationships between the Member States of EU. By replacing the previous extradition systems like the 1957 European Convention on Extradition (ECE), the EAW has introduced a system of surrender between judicial authorities for categorized offences, without control of double criminality and other traditional conditions for extradition. This system of surrender is established through Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (hereinafter “Framework Decision). The rules governing the Framework Decision in Finland are laid down in an Act of Parliament: laki (1286/2003) rikoksen johdosta tapahtuvasta luovuttamisesta Suomen ja muiden Euroopan unionin jäsenvaltioiden välillä. With the EAW, traditional political and diplomatic extradition cooperation between States is replaced by direct cooperation between judicial authorities. This means that the surrender is a judicial, and not anymore a political matter. Furthermore, as the surrender system is based on the principle of mutual recognition, an EAW is not a request in a traditional sense that can be granted or refused by the recipient State. According to Article 1(2) of the Framework Decision “shall” be executed and the terminology of Articles 3 and 4 of the FD speaks of cases on “non-execution” of an EAW rather than “refusal to grant”. The aim for the study is to find out in which situations and for what conditions a requested person can be surrendered from a Member State to another Member State within EU. This thesis explores the major changes that the EAW system has introduced compared to traditional extradition. Secondly, the study analyses the consequences that these changes have from the point of individual and what is the added value of the EAW for efficient criminal law cooperation between EU Member States. The aspect of the study focuses on the Member State level (in this case especially Finland). The thesis studies the impact of the EU developments on the national legislation with the aim of pinpointing similarities and differences between extradition and surrender; EU legislation and national Member State implementation legislation, and the influences which affect these distinctions. The thesis analyses the meaning and functioning of the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust. Mutual trust is an essential element of mutual recognition as it enables free movement of judicial decisions across the EU via the recognition and execution of foreign judgements with a minimum of formality and limited grounds for refusal. It is argued whether it is appropriate that cooperation can take place on the basis of a high level of mutual trust in the criminal justice systems of Member States, premised upon the presumption that fundamental rights are in principle respected fully across the EU. The thesis follows legal dogmatic methods. The aim is to analyse legal norms and legal constructions and give them content and context. The dogmatic method applied to the study is supported by practical analysis. The aim is not only to reach conclusions concerning the contents of legal norms e.g. rules governing extradition and surrender and requirements of law but study the practical functioning of these norms.

Osake ja modernit arvopaperimarkkinat on yhtiö- ja arvopaperimarkkinaoikeudellinen väitöskirja pörssiyhtiön osakkeen omistuksen sisällöstä suhteessa tiettyihin rahoitusvälineisiin. Osakkeenomistajilla on keskeinen rooli osakeyhtiön hallinnossa (corporate governancessa), sillä heille on annettu viimekätinen valta päättää yhtiön asioista äänestämällä yhtiökokouksessa. Perinteisesti suhteessa osakeyhtiöön osakkeen on katsottu muodostavan jakamattomana pidetyn oikeuksien ja velvollisuuksien summan. Lisäksi osakkeenomistajille annettuja oikeuksia on perusteltu oman pääoman ehtoisen sijoituksen riskillä, sillä yhtiön rahoittajien keskuudessa osakkeenomistajien sijoitusta on pidetty kaikkein riskipitoisimpana. Finanssiteknologian ja arvopaperimarkkinoiden kehityksen myötä perinteinen käsitys osakeomistuksen sisällöstä on murentumassa. Esimerkiksi eurooppalaiset aktivistiosakkeenomistajat ovat kyenneet pilkkomaan osakkeen tuottamia oikeuksia irti toisistansa ja muokkaamaan osakeomistuksen riskiä hyödyntämällä moderneja rahoitusvälineitä ja markkinakäytäntöjä, kuten johdannaisinstrumentteja ja lyhyeksimyyntiä. Tämä niin kutsuttu osakeoikeuksien pilkkominen on vaikuttanut eurooppalaiseen yhtiö- ja arvopaperimarkkinasääntelyä koskevaan sääntelypoliittiseen keskusteluun sekä muovannut pörssiyhtiöitä koskettavaa viimeaikaista EU-sääntelyä. Tutkimuksessa perehdytään syvällisesti pörssiyhtiön osakeomistusta määrittäviin taustateorioihin ja nykyaikaiseen osakkeenomistaja-aktivismiin. Toisaalta teoksessa tarkastellaan kattavasti käytännönläheisellä otteella osakkeenomistajan oikeuksia ja velvollisuuksia määrittävää yhtiö- ja arvopaperimarkkinaoikeudellista sääntelyä. Tutkimuksessa on huomioitu kattavasti pörssiyhtiöiden osakeomistusta koskettava kansallinen sääntely erityispiirteineen kuten myös viime aikoina merkittäviä muutoksia läpikäynyt EU-sääntely.

Copyright within university research and teaching Freedom of science is the basic principal at the universities. Freedom of science and copyright are both guaranteed as constitutional rights. Constitutional rights act as principals. When deciding a concrete case one has to chart which rights are applicable and then weight the balance of the rights. When studying copyright one has to take into account also directives and international agreements. National rules on copyright are based on several international agreements and a lot of directives have been given to harmonize national regulations. In principal constitutional rights such as scientific freedom have been ensured and taken into account when enacting copyright legislation. Changes in society and universities, however, create new situations where copyright appear and interact in a new way. When discussing the use of copyright protected material within university research and teaching one has to take into account how university functions have been divided into two sectors and how the principals directing university activities have to accommodate to changing conditions. In order to create more equal ways of handling copyright protected material at the universities and to ensure proper user rights for the university society university policies on copyright as well as a bit more detailed legislation on the relations between copyright and university research and teaching are needed. The present regulations do not ensure the rights of the university society to needed extent but leave too many situations uncertain.

The 1990s and the first years of the twenty-first century witnessed the sporadic emergence of a new vision of global law – one based on the human individual and humanity at large. Although it has taken many different forms, this vision has been uniform in its push to radically alter how we understand international law by seeking to posit the human as the primary subject of the international legal order and humanity as its main source of legitimacy. The vision is spelled out rather explicitly in some academic works, hinted at in others, and pops up here and there in international legal practice. Together, the thesis calls these instances “the law of humanity project”. The thesis provides an immanent critique of that project. In particular, it focuses on the outcomes of the project, asking how might the circulation of the humanity language, and in particular the claim that we are or should be moving towards law of humanity, produce and sustain such relations of power which are inimical to the aims of the project? In so doing, the thesis proceeds through three steps. Part I situates the emergence of the law of humanity project in a specific historical and theoretical context in the post-Cold War period and analyses its different academic manifestations. The central finding is that the project seeks to achieve its goals by increasing the importance and circulation of certain key concepts which are assumed to change the way we perceive international law. Three such concepts are identified, namely human rights, human security and human dignity. Part II challenges the underlying assumption of the law of humanity project that the increased relevance of the aforementioned concepts would necessarily change international law to the direction desired by the proponents of the project. Addressing each of the concepts individually, the Part argues that due to their indeterminacy, all of the concepts can be used for myriad purposes, some of which can be entirely opposite to the aims of the law of humanity theorists. Part III shifts gear and focuses on how humanity rhetoric has actually been used in action, and with what outcomes. The Part makes two key arguments for the entire thesis. The first is that although the humanity rhetoric has been impressive, it is not clear that it would have increased the well-being of individuals or empowered them. Where the rhetoric has clearly made an impact, however, is in disciplining the state and in allowing deep-penetrating interventions into what goes on within states and how they are organized. The second key argument is that the law of humanity project may operate like an ideology, obscuring how the humanity rhetoric can be used to produce and sustain relations of power by presenting all uses of rhetoric as further steps in a rather linear story culminating in the emergence of “law of humanity”. In so doing, it may enable such relations of power which are inimical to the main ideas of the law of humanity project and which are difficult to reconcile with the humanity rhetoric. This is so in particular because of forms of power/knowledge which may greatly benefit from the law of humanity project disciplining the state.

Every useful view to legal system is, at some extent, a perspective, which combines both hermeneutical and normative aspects of human mind. Indeed, in hermeneutics we do not just suffer lack of normative aspects in thinking while our “conceptual framework” is trained to identify and analyze conceptualized facts and phenomenas of the visual world. The problem is also, as it were, how to grasp a linguistic perspective to formation of value-judgments and normative speech in general. Last mentioned items are presupposed in hermeneutics. However, hermeneutical view and the question of language by which to gain position from which we would be able to use language as a tool also outside the scope of positive philosophy of science, are closely linked to each other. Normative aspect takes its steps towards the same problem – the problem of adequate language scheme – but from the different direction. Now we start, as it were in the kelsenian point of view, from the myth of norm and unsatisfactories are semantical by their very nature. We also would like to know how our antirealism works as a pragmatic craftmanship – used in hypothetical situations and guarded by our conceptual potentiality as a whole. Actuality of legal language is always a combination of these two perspectives. The language of legal system should be analogous to hermeneutical point of view to language in general. The semantical steps taken outside the scope of myth are to be adequate to needs of language-user who wishes – for example – to give commands, reason from juristic premises – or justify by means of language, that is: give the best possible argumentable solution to a given legal question. Thesis at hand is a feasibility study on larger investigation on “theory of elementary language” which could give us a better view on conceptuality especially on ethical issues concerning inner point of view and the use of language outside the immediate main field of the philosophy of ordinary language. Thesis interprets subject matter on two meanings. Firstly, how legal theory presupposes internal point of view (and how dworkinian “insider´s view” which I don´t consider distant general concept in comparison to hartian “internal point of view”) when we are dealing with different kinds of abstract problems in theory of law (chapters 2–4). Secondly, how far we can reach without mentioned point of view when making attempts to solve problems – or at least develop solutions to problems – emerging from particular normative cases or from the theory of law itself. Chapters 2–4 introduce the proper items of the work. If, at the same time, we understand them as arguments for the field of study of the internal language, our angle to legal theory is somewhat late wittgensteinian. Chapters are introducing perspectives to the problem of internal language needed both in naturalistic and noncognitive subjectivism. Chapter two deals with relativeness of the sources of law stating 24 different modes of sources. Chapter three interprets the conception of “institutional fact” from the idea of an implication (“ontic implies deontic”) which also have intimate connection to analogy. Chapter 4 interprets the problem of easy cases, that is, cases we consider intuitively and heuristically clear ones from the basis of our sources of law. Thesis claims that we have at least eight built-in ways on our reach to construe doubt in asking normative questions as a necessary conceptual condition for normative thinking.