Browsing by Subject "judgment"

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  • Haaparanta, Leila (Routledge, 2019)
    This paper applies the contemporary idea of the constitutive features of assertions to the texts of Gottlob Frege, Rudolf Carnap, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The focus is in Frege and Carnap, but a connection to Wittgenstein’s remarks on philosophy is indicated at the end of the paper. I intend to study and compare the three philosophers’ views on philosophical asserting and philosophical assertions. The question about the limits of language is thus posed in pragmatic terms, because it is formulated as a question about the limits set to linguistic acts labelled as assertings. I focus on Frege’s Begriffschrift (1879) and his Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884), and on Carnap’s article titled “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” (1950/1956); I then make a few remarks on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty. I argue that there are important connections between Frege’s and Carnap’s views on the limits of asserting. Their otherwise diverging positions are connected in that, as they show, it is not easy for philosophers themselves to comply with the norms they give for judging and asserting. I argue that while Frege does not make his attitude towards philosophical assertions explicit, the common core in Carnap’s and Wittgenstein’s texts is that the epistemic norms they give to assertions lead both to deny the possibility of philosophical assertions.
  • Silva, José Filipe (2017)
    By the end of the thirteenth century several models of visual perception were available in the Latin West, differing according to their influences - Aristotelian, Augustinian, Avicennian - and their interpretations. One such model was that of perspectivist optics, as espoused by Alhacen and popularized by Roger Bacon. While the general structure of this theory is well-known, until recently scholars have paid less attention to the issue of discrimination - distinction, comparison, judgment - by a higher cognitive faculty (the virtus distinctiva) of incoming sensory information. In my paper, I specifically examine what role this discriminative faculty, as proposed by Alhacen, plays in the works of later perspectivi such as Roger Bacon, John Pecham, and Blasius of Parma, proceeding from the assumption that the best way to understanding the influence of any given theory is by understanding the authors influenced by it. My focus is on two aspects of this power: what exactly its functions are, and whether its nature is rational or sensory. Building on this last aspect, I consider whether this nature is better suited for passive or active accounts of perception.