This paper forms part of an edited volume on “The Many Constitutions of Europe” (Tuori and Sankari 2010), to which it contributes a distinctly sociological perspective. It notably reconceives the various constitutions discussed in the volume as ideal types in the sense of Max Weber. In doing so, it builds on an understanding of the sociology of law as a ‘science of culture’ which takes the value-relatedness of legal ideas seriously. Following Tuori’s relational understanding of constitutions, the paper systematically explores the social references of the four ‘material’ constitutions (economic constitution, political constitution, social constitution, security constitution; thus omitting the self-referential juridical constitution) in terms of their main argument (evolution, enlightenment, embeddedness, enforcement), their related concepts of social order (oikos, polis, nomos, physis) and their respective models of man, society, and law. Accordingly, the economic constitution is characterized by an emphasis on homo oeconomicus, market society, the economic system, and individual will, whereas the political constitution emphasizes homo politicus, civil society, the political-cultural system, and individual reason. In turn, the social constitution focuses on homo sociologicus, legal community, the life world, and collective reason. Finally, the security constitution is oriented towards homo gubernabilis, control society, the government system, and collective will. Furthermore, the constitutional ideal types are qualified with regard to their globalization potential. Whereas social constitution and security constitution presuppose a stronger notion of the collective, which has long been defined in national terms, the economic and political constitutions point beyond the nation state and to the idea, or reality, of global(ized) individuals. The paper concludes with a plea to always consider both the territorial and the functional dimension of societal differentiation, and thus suggests studying the many constitutions of Europe (and in the world) according to a two-dimensional ‘cobweb model’.

The predicament of modern capitalism, and of contemporary finance capitalism in particular, is the fine line between credit and crisis. Recent developments from the US subprime mortgage crisis to the European sovereign debt crisis revived debates about the nature of money and all sorts of derivatives. Money is a social phenomenon which has always two sides: an economic and a legal one. As an economic commodity, it hinges on the market; as a legal relation, it depends on the state. The resulting tension features prominently in the works of Max Weber and Karl Polanyi. Both studied the market society of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, including its monetary institutions. Moreover, both were also aware of the political function of their related writings. The following review allows us to establish links between law, economy, and society and thus exemplify the economic sociology of law as it is foreshadowed by the sociological classics.

International economic law is dominated by ‘international law’ and ‘economic law’ perspectives. Socio-legal perspectives do gain ground at the margins of the field, but a sociology of international economic law, which addresses not only the subject matter but also the disciplinary dynamics of the field, has so far been missing. Drawing on Polanyi’s The Great Transformation and recent work in the economic sociology of law, this article puts the ‘law of market society’ centre stage in developing a genuine sociology of international economic law. This includes a sociology of law and economics, which exposes how the discipline (power structure) of international economic law is articulated with the discipline (knowledge structure) of law and economics. The law of market society includes all types of law that constitute or regulate the market, be it public or private law, national, international or even transnational law. Taking off from Polanyian ideas, law is conceived as a social institution ‘embedding’ the economy, but also as a ‘fictitious commodity’ which is itself subject to market forces. The tension between law’s commodifying and decommodifying functions, which these concepts illuminate, is reflected in legal discourse. Moreover, it seems to drive ‘law’s great transformation’ from its universalist origins in the nineteenth century to its national closings in the twentieth century, and to its transnational openings in the twenty-first century. In this sense, the law of market society follows itself a ‘double movement’.

Émile Durkheim known among other things for his pioneering sociology of criminal law was also a corporatist theorist and can be interpreted as a predecessor for an institutionalist approach that has recently gained popularity in comparative criminal justice. Durkheim suggested an inverse relationship between the intensities of ‘repressive’ regulation and ‘restitutive’ welfare state regulation. Contemporary institutionalist research has arrived at the same conclusion, but the connection between Durkheim’s theory and the empirical observations of modern comparative research has gone largely unnoticed in both legal scholarship and sociology. Correcting this omission might prove useful for substantive theory: Apart from welfare state strength, neo-institutionalist research has also associated lenient criminal law with corporatist political economy and consensus democracy. Durkheim’s political sociology proposes an answer for the interrelationship between these factors. Durkheim considered social corporatism a democratic institution and as such a precondition for a democracy capable of building the collective restitutive regulation that could alleviate society’s reliance on punitive justice as a basis for social cohesion.