There is a growing literature in economics on whose interests should count in corporate decision-making. The aim of my thesis is to compare the merits of the two central approaches shareholder value and stakeholder view - in a theoretical framework. The work builds on the model by Roberts and Van den Steen (2000). There are two parties, an investor and an employee. The investor owns a firm. Initially the employee's firm-specific human capital is necessary for there to be any output. It is assumed that the employee is credit constrained, and that enforceable contracts cannot be written either on investments or output. Since investing in human capital is costly for the employee, the question then arises, how can the employee be motivated to acquire valuable firm-specific human capital? The answer is that the investor gives the employee a fraction of the votes on the board, which has to agree on how the returns are divided before the production takes place and the returns are realised. To move beyond the basic hold-up problem described above 1 add a second period into the model. Now, in the beginning of the second period there emerges with a positive probability a new production technology that the investor would like to adopt. The production technology is such that, if adopted, it makes the employee's firm-specific human capital valueless. Hence, the employee cannot any longer bargain a return on his investment. As a result, there emerges an interest conflict between the parties over the production technology. The key question then is, who should have control over whether this new technology is adopted? The idea is that the investor faces a trade-off between short-run investment incentives and long-run flexibility: by giving up his unilateral right to choose the production technology, the investor enhances the employee's investment incentives but simultaneously loses his ability to flexibly make changes. Then, the investor is willing to commit (give the employee a veto) only if the output under the new technology is low enough. Then, the natural follow-up question is whether there is any way to achieve flexibility without reducing the employee's investment incentives. 1 propose two solutions. With firm-specific human capital, a severance pay could be used to align the parties' interests since it allows the investor to buy out the employee from the firm without triggering the negative effects on employee's investment incentives. Using a severance pay would also be socially desirable. However, a severance pay is a costly way for the investor to achieve flexibility so that there is an interest conflict between social and the investor's interests. Another solution is to use a different type of human capital (general human capital) that is more flexible by nature so that the interest conflict doesn't arise in the first place. Although general human capital is less productive than firm-specific human capital its adaptability may more than exceed the losses in productivity.

Since the Great Depression of 1930s technological unemployment debates have re-emerged every 20 years. This thesis examines the automation debates in Finland in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and again in the mid-1990s. The aim is to understand, why the debate re-emerges and what is the nature of the debate? The sources of the study consists of articles published in 1977–1999 in Helsingin Sanomat. Newspaper articles are complemented with other documents referred to by Helsingin Sanomat. Text analysis is used to study the documents and emerging narratives are incorporated with international context. A public debate on technological unemployment begins in situations where high unemployment combines with technological revolution. Automation anxiety was especially caused by the penetration of automation into new sectors of the economy. Technological unemployment has served as a tool for political mobilization calling for solutions to threats from new technology. In this work these solutions are referred as mediation mechanisms of technological change. Reducing working hours, education and redefining the concept of work are examples of these mediation mechanisms that emerged in the debate. The recurrence of the automation debate tells about the dynamics of techno-economic development, adaptation to change, and the production of new socio-institutional structures. From this point of view ‘the end of work’ or the threat of mass unemployment do not appear as false predictions but as arguments for required and necessary mediation mechanisms of technological change. Technological unemployment is a potential consequence of political choices and development of the society.