INFORMATION SHARING IN BANKING: AN ANTI-COMPETITIVE DEVICE?

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dc.contributor.author Gehrig, Thomas
dc.contributor.author Stenbacka, Rune
dc.date.accessioned 2014-08-18T10:55:04Z
dc.date.available 2014-08-18T10:55:04Z
dc.date.issued 2002-07-01
dc.identifier.isbn 951-555-733-X
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10138/135766
dc.description.abstract We analyse the institution of information sharing in a model of repeated banking competition. In the presence of switching costs we find that information sharing renders poaching more profitable in future rounds of competition, since the poaching activities can be targeted to creditworthy borrowers. Thus borrower poaching may occur even when it would not be profitable without information sharing. At the same time information sharing reduces relationship benefits, and competition for initial market shares is weakened. Overall we find that information sharing enhances equilibrium profits weakly in general and strictly in the presence of switching cost. fi
dc.language.iso en fi
dc.publisher Hanken School of Economics fi
dc.relation.ispartofseries 5 fi
dc.title INFORMATION SHARING IN BANKING: AN ANTI-COMPETITIVE DEVICE? fi
dc.type Working Paper fi
dc.subject.ysa information sharing fi
dc.subject.ysa poaching fi
dc.subject.ysa switching costs fi
dc.subject.ysa credit markets fi
dc.subject.ysa banking fi

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