REGULATED BUSINESS HOURS, COMPETITION, AND LABOR UNIONS

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dc.contributor.author Shy, Oz
dc.contributor.author Stenbacka, Rune
dc.date.accessioned 2014-08-18T11:18:55Z
dc.date.available 2014-08-18T11:18:55Z
dc.date.issued 2002-08-06
dc.identifier.isbn 951-555-734-8
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10138/135771
dc.description.abstract We analyze a retail industry where shops compete in prices and opening hours. We demonstrate that stores with longer opening hours tend to charge higher prices. Then, we calculate the symmetric equilibrium in closing hours and demonstrate a market failure with opening hours shorter than the socially optimal level. Furthermore, we characterize a condition under which labor unions would set high wages that would limit opening hours below the equilibrium level. Thus, opening hours shorter than the equilibrium level would be consistent with an outcome affected by strong labor unions. fi
dc.language.iso en fi
dc.publisher Hanken School of Economics fi
dc.relation.ispartofseries 6 fi
dc.title REGULATED BUSINESS HOURS, COMPETITION, AND LABOR UNIONS fi
dc.type Working Paper fi
dc.subject.ysa regulated business hours fi
dc.subject.ysa labor unions fi
dc.subject.ysa opening hours fi
dc.subject.ysa regulated closing hours fi

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