Recent Submissions

  • Hyytinen, Ari; Steen, Frode; Toivanen, Otto (2018)
    How many cartels are there, and how long do they live? The answers to these questions are important in assessing the need for competition policy. We present a Hidden Markov Model that takes into account that often it is not known whether a cartel exists or not. We take the model to data from a period of legal cartels - Finnish manufacturing industries 1951-1990. Our estimates suggest that once born, cartels are persistent; by the end of the period, almost all industries were cartelized.
  • Miettinen, Topi; Perea, Andrés (2015-07)
  • Andersson, Ola; Huysentruyt, Marieke; Miettinen, Topi; Stephan, Ute (2016-02-29)
  • Miettinen, Topi; Stenbacka, Rune (2018-08-04)
    We study a duopoly model of history-based price competition with switching costs and demonstrate how strategic history-based pricing induces the owners of the firms to implement managerial short-termism by delegating the pricing decisions to managers with a discount factor lower than that of the owners. Managerial short-termism is a strategic device whereby owners can soften price competition at the stage when customer relationships are established. The degree of short short-termism is shown to depend on the market structure, the intensity of competition and the magnitude of switching costs.
  • Boly, Amadou; Gillanders, Robert (2018-06-19)
    We analyse policymakers’ incentives to fight corruption under different institutional qualities. We find that ‘public officials’, even when non-corrupt, significantly distort anti-corruption institutions by choosing a lower detection probability when this probability applies to their own actions (legal equality), compared to a setting where it does not (legal inequality). More surprising perhaps is the finding that policy-makers do not choose a zero level of detection on average, even when it applies to them too. Finally, corruption is significantly lower when the detection probability is exogenously set, suggesting that the institutional power to choose detection can itself be corruptive.
  • Ekman, Mats Johan (2017-12-21)
    This article extends the Coase Conjecture to ethical issues of property rights. The Coase Conjecture combines well with the Lockean labour-mixing criterion to limit the boundaries of morally legitimate initial acquisitions of unowned property; whenever the Coase Conjecture applies, the Lockean Proviso that there be “enough and as good” left is automatically satisfied. The essential point is that, when a claim is made, the marginal willingness to pay for the last portion of it is zero (infra-marginally, willingness to pay may be arbitrarily high). Thus, the market price of the claim is zero, except for the part of it that the claimant inhabits or improves. “Excessive” claims therefore come to have a zero market price, so anyone may take possession of them, by purchase or theft. In either case they must compensate the original claimant by a zero amount. It follows that non-claimants do not lose by putatively “excessive” grabs by claimants. Under these circumstances, any initial claims are just.
  • Ekman, Mats Johan (2017-11-13)
    In this empirical analysis of voting patterns in five countries on days when one or more national referenda were held, voter turnout appears to decline in the number of concurrent referenda, in contrast to standard theories’ predictions and regardless of method used to hold constant the quality of the referenda. Multiple concurrent referenda imply “quantity discounts” as one may vote on more ballots in one visit to the polling station. They should also draw more voters due to the wider range of interests attracted when more issues are up for vote. Yet, none of this seems to happen in the data. More recent developments, such as rule-utilitarian and information-based theories of voting, fare similarly poorly in light of the evidence presented in this article; a social theory of voting does better.
  • Storsjö, Isabell; Sveiby, Karl-Erik; Schimanski, Caroline (2015)
    This is an application of the "Surplus to Surplus" simulation. The purpose is to share one's "suplus ideas" with others.
  • Gillanders, Robert (2016)
  • Ellingsen, Tore; Miettinen, Topi (2014-09)
  • Miettinen, Topi (2009)
    Recent literature has established a link between the fully cursed equilibrium and the analogy-based expectation equilibrium. In this note, even the partially cursed equilibrium is shown to correspond to an analogy-based expectation equilibrium.
  • Miettinen, Topi (2012)
    The analogy-based expectation equilibrium, or simply analogy equilibrium (AE), analyzes equilibrium stereotypes by imposing consistency of infinitely large action samples with the expectation that broad classes of opponent types behave identically. This paper introduces the payoff-confirming analogy equilibrium (PAE) to refine the set of analogy equilibria. The concept imposes additionally that sample marginal of own payoffs be consistent with one’s expectations. Robust incorrect equilibrium stereotypes, i.e. non-Bayesian Nash PAE are shown to exist. General conditions are given for the prevalence of such stereotypes under correct expectations on exogenous uncertainty. In monotone selection games susceptible to winner’s curse, naive behavioral equilibrium leading to aggravation of adverse selection has been shown to match plausible informational assumptions of experienced, but behaviorally biased, equilibrium play. Here, behavioral equilibrium is matched with a corresponding PAE with an incorrect prior and correct prior is shown to imply correct overall expectations.
  • Miettinen, Topi; Poutvaara, Panu (2014-03)
  • Stenbacka, Rune; Tombak, Mihkel (2012)
  • Koskela, Erkki; Stenbacka, Rune; Juselius, Mikael (2013)
  • Gehrig, Thomas; Shy, Oz; Stenbacka, Rune (2012)

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