Anti-Poaching Agreements in Labor Markets

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Shy , O & Stenbacka , R 2018 , ' Anti-Poaching Agreements in Labor Markets ' , Economic Inquiry , vol. 57 , no. 1 , pp. 243-263 . https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12700

Title: Anti-Poaching Agreements in Labor Markets
Author: Shy, Oz; Stenbacka, Rune
Contributor: Hanken School of Economics, Economics, Helsinki
Belongs to series: Economic Inquiry
ISSN: 0095-2583
Abstract: We analyze competition for experienced workers among wage‐setting firms. The firms can design poaching offers with higher wages to workers who switch from rivals relative to wages paid to their own existing employees. We evaluate the profit and welfare effects of anti‐poaching agreements that eliminate poaching offers as a recruiting method. Anti‐poaching agreements increase industry profits, whereas workers are made worse off. We show that the effects of anti‐poaching agreements on total welfare are determined by the magnitude of workers' switching costs and the productivity change associated with switching employers.
Date: 2018-07-28
Subject: 512 Business and Management
Anti-poaching agreements
wage competition
anticompetitive behavior
poaching offers
switching employers
labor mobility
productivity
KOTA2018
PREM2018_09
0 - Not open access
1 - Self archived
https://helda.helsinki.fi/dhanken/handle/10227/406224
1- Minst en av författarna har en utländsk affiliation
1- Publicerad utomlands
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