Economic uncertainty and corruption: Evidence from public and private firms

Show full item record

Permalink

Citation

Afzali , M , Colak , G & Fu , M 2021 , ' Economic uncertainty and corruption: Evidence from public and private firms ' , Journal of Financial Stability , vol. 57 , 100936 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2021.100936

Title: Economic uncertainty and corruption: Evidence from public and private firms
Author: Afzali, Mansoor; Colak, Gonul; Fu, Mengchuan
Contributor: Hanken School of Economics, Accounting, Helsinki
Hanken School of Economics, Finance, Helsinki
Belongs to series: Journal of Financial Stability
ISSN: 1572-3089
Abstract: We study the influence of policy uncertainty on the moral behavior of firms. When facing uncertainty, managers perceive various socioeconomic obstacles as more severe and disruptive to their business. Using data from policy uncertainty spouts in 93 countries, we document that some firms engage in norm-deviant behavior by cheating on taxes and paying more bribes. While private firms prefer to cheat on taxes, public firms choose bribery as a favorite tool to “grease the wheels” during periods of uncertainty. Strong social capital (local trust and religiosity) breaks this link between uncertainty and corruption.
Date: 2021-12-01
Subject: 511 Economics
corruption
trust
517 Political science
economic policy uncertainty
private firms
corruption
bribery
cheating on taxes
trust
religiosity
KOTA2021?
PREM2021_12
2 - Hybrid open access publication channel
1 - Self archived
https://helda.helsinki.fi/dhanken/handle/10138/160162
1- Minst en av författarna har en utländsk affiliation
1- Publicerad utomlands
0- Ingen affiliation med ett företag
AoS: Financial management, accounting, and governance
SDG 16 - Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
SDG 8 - Decent Work and Economic Growth
Rights:


Files in this item

Total number of downloads: Loading...

Files Size Format View
1_s2.0_S1572308921000954_main.pdf 1.346Mb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show full item record