Essays on the Costs and Benefits of Large Shareholders in Corporate Governance (summary section only)

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http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:951-555-830-1
Title: Essays on the Costs and Benefits of Large Shareholders in Corporate Governance (summary section only)
Author: Maury, Benjamin
Contributor: Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration, Department of Finance and Statistics, Finance
Thesis level: Doctoral thesis
Belongs to series: Economics and Society - 127
ISBN: 951-555-830-1
Abstract: “Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to firms assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737). According to La Porta et al. (1999), research in corporate finance relevant for most countries should focus on the incentives and capabilities of controlling shareholders to treat themselves preferentially at the expense of minority shareholders. Accordingly, this thesis sets out to answer a number of research questions regarding the role of large shareholders in public firms that have received little attention in the literature so far. A common theme in the essays stems from the costs and benefits of individual large-block owners and the role of control contestability from the perspective of outside minority shareholders. The first essay empirically examines whether there are systematic performance differences between family controlled and nonfamily controlled firms in Western Europe. In contrast to the widely held view that family control penalizes firm value, the essay shows that publicly traded family firms have higher performance than comparable firms. In the second essay, we present both theoretical and empirical analysis on the effects of control contestability on firm valuation. Consistent with the theoretical model, the empirical results show that minority shareholders benefit from a more contestable control structure. The third essay explores the effects of individual large-block owners on top management turnover and board appointments in Finnish listed firms. The results indicate that firm performance is an important determinant for management and board restructurings. For certain types of turnover decisions the corporate governance structure influences the performance / turnover sensitivity. In the fourth essay, we investigate the relation between the governance structure and dividend policy in Finnish listed firms. We find evidence in support of the outcome agency model of dividends stating that lower agency conflicts should be associated with higher dividend payouts.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10227/99
URN:ISBN:951-555-830-1
Date: 2004-05-14
Subject: corporate governance
ownership structure
agency conflicts
valuation
controlling shareholders
family firms
multiple blockholders
management turnover
board turnover
dividend policy
Rights: This publication is copyrighted. You may download, display and print it for Your own personal use. Commercial use is prohibited.


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