Anti-corruption policy making, discretionary power and institutional quality

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Boly , A & Gillanders , R 2018 , ' Anti-corruption policy making, discretionary power and institutional quality : An experimental analysis ' , Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 152 , no. August , pp. 314-327 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.05.007

Title: Anti-corruption policy making, discretionary power and institutional quality;
An experimental analysis
Author: Boly, Amadou; Gillanders, Robert
Contributor: Hanken School of Economics, Economics, Helsinki
Belongs to series: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
ISSN: 0167-2681
Abstract: We analyse policymakers’ incentives to fight corruption under different institutional qualities. We find that ‘public officials’, even when non-corrupt, significantly distort anti-corruption institutions by choosing a lower detection probability when this probability applies to their own actions (legal equality), compared to a setting where it does not (legal inequality). More surprising perhaps is the finding that policy-makers do not choose a zero level of detection on average, even when it applies to them too. Finally, corruption is significantly lower when the detection probability is exogenously set, suggesting that the institutional power to choose detection can itself be corruptive.
Date: 2018-06-19
Subject: 511 Economics
Anti-corruption
Embezzlement
Experimental economics
Institutions
Policy-making
KOTA2018
PREM2018_09
2 - Hybrid open access publication channel
1 - Self archived
1- Minst en av författarna har en utländsk affiliation
1- Publicerad utomlands
0- Ingen affiliation med ett företag
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