States, Markets, the Finance Lobby and the European Union Savings Tax Directive

Abstract

The thesis analyses, from an international policy perspective, the negotiations and lobbying to achieve the European Union Savings tax Directive. The theoretical approach is mainly based on professor Susan Strange"s doctrinal framework of the four structures of power. Some of the primary documents from and a number of newspaper reports on the negotiations have functioned as the main sources for the research. The analysis is concentrated on structural factors that on one hand have facilitated and on the other hand constrained the negotiation process. These are described on three different analytical levels - the world systemic, the inter- and transnational and the national. Special and equal emphasis is put on the analysis of states and international organizations, as well as market forces and private actors. The thesis argues that the juxtapositions of the negotiations originate primarily in historical factors and the different market conditions of the national financial industry. The disparities are most noticeable between high-tax industrialized countries and tax havens. But countries like Belgium, UK and USA have also slowed down the process by taking principled positions in certain matters. One of the most important conclusions of the thesis is that agreement on the directive was finally achieved because perseverant positions were discarded in favour of relevant transfers of resources for security, production, finance and knowledge justifiable to all parties. The necessary compromises have tended to limit equality between the parties and to accentuate the structurally strong position of the richest. Smaller investors suffer from more negative effects of the directive than big ones and some of the strongest financial centres - London, New York and Switzerland - have seen the claws of EU miss the target.