Yliopiston etusivulle Suomeksi På svenska In English Helsingin yliopisto

Adverse Selection and Costly Screening in Credit Markets

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dc.contributor Helsingin yliopisto, Yleisen valtio-opin laitos fi
dc.contributor University of Helsinki, Department of Political Science en
dc.contributor Helsingfors universitet, Allmän statslära, Institutionen för sv
dc.contributor.author Vauhkonen, Jukka
dc.date.accessioned 2009-09-08T09:45:49Z
dc.date.available 2009-09-08T09:45:49Z
dc.date.issued 1999-03-01 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10138/11820
dc.description Endast avhandlingens sammandrag. Pappersexemplaret av hela avhandlingen finns för läsesalsbruk i Statsvetenskapliga biblioteket (Unionsgatan 35). Dessa avhandlingar fjärrutlånas endast som microfiche. sv
dc.description Abstract only. The paper copy of the whole thesis is available for reading room use at the Library of Social Sciences (Unioninkatu 35) . Microfiche copies of these theses are available for interlibrary loans. en
dc.description Vain tiivistelmä. Opinnäytteiden sidotut arkistokappaleet ovat luettavissa HY:n keskustakampuksen valtiotieteiden kirjastossa (Unioninkatu 35). Opinnäytteitä lainataan ainoastaan mikrokortteina kirjaston kaukopalvelun välityksellä fi
dc.description.abstract In this thesis we analyse the functioning of credit markets in environments where adverse selection interferes with an efficient allocation of capital. Throughout the thesis we assume that borrowers have private information on the profitability of their investment projects and, consequently, on the probability of being able to repay the funds they have loaned. A special feature of our thesis is that lenders can reduce or totally eliminate the adverse selection problem by expending resources on the ex-ante screening of borrowers. Thus, by investing in ex-ante screening lenders can reduce the informational gap between them and borrowers before the financial contract is signed. In the first model we derive the optimal financial contracts between a monopoly lender and two types of borrowers in an environment where good borrowers' return distributions first-order stochastically dominate bad borrowers' return distributions and where the lender has access to a costly and perfect screening technology. When the lender can commit to stochastic screening; that is, when she can commit to inspect only a certain proportion of loan applicants, the unique optimal contract for bad borrowers combines features of equity and call option contracts. This results contradicts earlier studies, where in an otherwise identical environment but with a large number of small and identical lenders the optimal contract is the standard debt contract. In our second model we investigate how the loan interest rate competition between two banks, only one of which has access to a costly but imperfect ex-ante monitoring technology, affects the optimal level of monitoring and, more generally, the feasibility of monitoring. We compare the investments in monitoring between a monopoly bank and a banking duopoly. We show that the state of economy is a crucial determinant of the effects of competition on the investment in monitoring: for low values of the state of economy, an increase in competition has no effects on monitoring incentives; for intermediate values of the state economy, competition reduces incentives to monitor; and for sufficiently high values of the state of economy, an increase in competition even increases investments in the monitoring technology. Furthermore, the intensity of competition between the two banks is shown to be an increasing function of the state of economy. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.subject adverse selection - credit markets en
dc.subject ex-ante screening - banking competition en
dc.title Adverse Selection and Costly Screening in Credit Markets en
dc.identifier.laitoskoodi 711 en
dc.type.ontasot Licentiate thesis en
dc.type.ontasot Lisensiaatintyö fi
dc.type.ontasot Licentiatsavhandling sv

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