President vs. Parliament: The Elite Struggel in the Attempt to Privatize Russia

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dc.contributor University of Helsinki, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science en
dc.contributor Helsingin yliopisto, Valtiotieteellinen tiedekunta, Yleisen valtio-opin laitos fi
dc.contributor Helsingfors universitet, Statsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för allmän statslära sv Doulos, Andreas 2009-09-08T09:50:13Z 2009-09-08T09:50:13Z 2006-05-02
dc.description Endast sammandrag. Inbundna avhandlingar kan sökas i Helka-databasen ( Elektroniska kopior av avhandlingar finns antingen öppet på nätet eller endast tillgängliga i bibliotekets avhandlingsterminaler. sv
dc.description Only abstract. Paper copies of master’s theses are listed in the Helka database ( Electronic copies of master’s theses are either available as open access or only on thesis terminals in the Helsinki University Library. en
dc.description Vain tiivistelmä. Sidottujen gradujen saatavuuden voit tarkistaa Helka-tietokannasta ( Digitaaliset gradut voivat olla luettavissa avoimesti verkossa tai rajoitetusti kirjaston opinnäytekioskeilla. fi
dc.description.abstract The aim of this thesis is to look at how the process of privatization of state property, and thus state industry, had an effect in the problematic political symbiosis of the Russian legislature and executive, which ended in October 1993 with the shelling of the Russian White House. In the attempt to understand and analyze the political developments of the late Soviet and nascent Russian state in the period between 1990-1993, the notion of the State is approached as a "melange of social organizations" seeking to control resources and promote their interests. The institutional framework that was set during Mikhail Gorbachev's attempt to reform the USSR, was inherited by Russia, without drafting a new constitution. The lack of a complete and applicable legal framework in the process of privatization that was launched on January 1st 1992 by the govrnment of President Yeltsin allowed some "social organizations" to grasp or retain control of prosperous state companies, in a process named euphemistically "insider privatization". Starting with Pareto's premise that revolutions are mainly a matter of elite change, it is concluded that in Russia, contrary to other transitional cases, the elites of the old regime managed to remain intact in the new political circumstances. Those elite groups that managed to take advantage of the new chances that a new free market environment offered, mainly through their ability to control key assets of the economy during the socialist times, mobilized themselves and contested the role of state power in the reform process. The group of former industrial directors preserved its strong networking from the previous socialist system and managed to achieve the goals it had set, without difficulties: preserve the control of the most important state enterprises and prevent outside investors from obtaining ownership of enterprises. The difficulties Russia faced during its transition were a result of non functioning democratic institutions, preventing effective rule. It was obvious that the problematic co-existence of President and Parliament was a result of the failure of the political elite to introduce a viable consensus and face demanding financial problems. en
dc.language.iso en
dc.subject Russia en
dc.subject Transition en
dc.subject Privatization en
dc.subject Elites en
dc.subject Industrial Directors en
dc.subject President Yeltsin en
dc.subject Russian Parliament en
dc.title President vs. Parliament: The Elite Struggel in the Attempt to Privatize Russia en
dc.identifier.laitoskoodi 711
dc.type.ontasot master's thesis en
dc.type.ontasot pro gradu -tutkielmat fi
dc.type.ontasot pro gradu-avhandlingar sv
dc.type.dcmitype Text
dc.format.content abstractOnly

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