On the optimal novelty requirement in patent protection

Näytä kaikki kuvailutiedot



Pysyväisosoite

http://hdl.handle.net/10138/12571
Julkaisun nimi: On the optimal novelty requirement in patent protection
Tekijä: Miettunen, Antti
Muu tekijä: Helsingin yliopisto, Valtiotieteellinen tiedekunta, Yleisen valtio-opin laitos
Päiväys: 2008-04-04
Kieli: en
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/12571
Opinnäytteen taso: Lisensiaatintyö
Tiivistelmä: This Licentiate Thesis belongs to the area of economics of immaterial property rights. The aim of the Thesis is to study one of the legal patentability requirements, namely the novelty requirement, in a theoretical general equilibrium model. We study the novelty requirement under the assumption that both an idea as well as research and development investments are needed for an innovation. We assume that ideas are a scarce resource, they are generated via an exogenous process, and that R&D activity is costly. In order to invest in R&D activity, firms must have sufficient incentives to do so. We equate the novelty value of an innovation with the economic value, or utility, it produces. We consider four different versions of this basic setup. In the most satisfactory version there are three parameters: the number of ideas, the survival probability of innovations, and the patent strength. The patent strength is modeled as the probability that the innovator gets to keep the returns from the innovation to her. The model successfully captures the tension between the objectives of the society and an individual innovator, changes in parameters can be traced to aggregate measures, the model is well-behaved both analytically and numerically and the results are intuitive. We show that in this kind of a general setting, the scarcity of research ideas is sufficient to make non-zero novelty requirement optimal. This is a noteworthy result since scarcity is an important element in many optimal patent policy models in the literature. We also study the relationship between novelty requirement and equilibrium investments and show that as a function of the novelty requirement the equilibrium investment takes an inverse-U-shaped form. We also consider novelty both under perfect and imperfect patent regimes. Getting analytical results in a model of cumulative innovations where there are simultaneously two endogenous policy instruments, novelty requirement and patent strength, is left for future research. The current model is also limited in that it is a model of perfect information where strategic behavior is abstracted away.
Kuvaus: Endast sammandrag. Inbundna avhandlingar kan sökas i Helka-databasen (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Elektroniska kopior av avhandlingar finns antingen öppet på nätet eller endast tillgängliga i bibliotekets avhandlingsterminaler.Only abstract. Paper copies of master’s theses are listed in the Helka database (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Electronic copies of master’s theses are either available as open access or only on thesis terminals in the Helsinki University Library.Vain tiivistelmä. Sidottujen gradujen saatavuuden voit tarkistaa Helka-tietokannasta (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Digitaaliset gradut voivat olla luettavissa avoimesti verkossa tai rajoitetusti kirjaston opinnäytekioskeilla.
Avainsanat: patents
innovations
novelty requirement
patentit
innovaatiot


Tiedostot

Latausmäärä yhteensä: Ladataan...

Tiedosto(t) Koko Formaatti Näytä
abstract.pdf 48.66KB PDF Avaa tiedosto

Viite kuuluu kokoelmiin:

Näytä kaikki kuvailutiedot