The accession negotiatiations on agriculture between Poland and the EU as an example of two - level game model

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dc.contributor Helsingin yliopisto, Yleisen valtio-opin laitos fi
dc.contributor University of Helsinki, Department of Political Science en
dc.contributor Helsingfors universitet, Allmän statslära, Institutionen för sv Czajka, Ewa 2009-09-08T10:00:58Z 2009-09-08T10:00:58Z 2003-13-10 en
dc.description Endast sammandrag. Inbundna avhandlingar kan sökas i Helka-databasen ( Elektroniska kopior av avhandlingar finns antingen öppet på nätet eller endast tillgängliga i bibliotekets avhandlingsterminaler. sv
dc.description Only abstract. Paper copies of master’s theses are listed in the Helka database ( Electronic copies of master’s theses are either available as open access or only on thesis terminals in the Helsinki University Library. en
dc.description Vain tiivistelmä. Sidottujen gradujen saatavuuden voit tarkistaa Helka-tietokannasta ( Digitaaliset gradut voivat olla luettavissa avoimesti verkossa tai rajoitetusti kirjaston opinnäytekioskeilla. fi
dc.description.abstract The aim of this thesis is to describe and understand international bargaining process between Poland and the European Union (EU) over the issue of direct payments, which is one of mechanisms of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The research had been conducted within the two-level game model according to which the negotiatior has to addrres the two imperatives at the same time, domestic and international. The methodological principle of research on international negotiations is to multiply the number of observations within the analyzed case what allow for the reliable scientific testing. Methodologically, level games seem to solve the level – of analysis problem by taking into account both domestic and international variables to explain outcomes. Nevertheless within the model were applied the factors of comparative analysis and discourse analysis. The results obtained: 1. Two-level game becames difficult when applied to the EU because of its structural complexity. The EU does not speak with the one voice while conducting accession negotiations. 2. The internal division of domestic faction can be both creative and destructive. 3. The state can gain strenght out of weakness by picturing to the opposing side the growing costs of domestic 'no-agreement'. 4. The role of the Commisssion during the accession negotiations was recognized as passive. 5. The most profound negotiation tools are: linkage issue, side-payments,package deals and tradeoffs. The most significant startegies: 'tight hands', 'take it or leave it', yielding, contending and problem-solving. The tools stated above had the biggest impact on the course of negotiations. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.subject Euroopan unioni - maatalous - Puola en
dc.subject vertaileva tutkimus en
dc.subject diskurssi - tutkimus en
dc.subject Puola - maatalous - neuvottelu en
dc.subject EU - agriculture - Poland en
dc.subject comparative studies en
dc.subject discourse - studies en
dc.subject Poland - agriculture - negotiations en
dc.title The accession negotiatiations on agriculture between Poland and the EU as an example of two - level game model en
dc.identifier.laitoskoodi 711 en
dc.type.ontasot Master's thesis en
dc.type.ontasot Pro gradu fi
dc.type.ontasot Pro gradu sv

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