Väittämistaakka, tuomarin kyselyvelvollisuus ja pakottavaan yksityisoikeudelliseen sääntelyyn perustuvien vaatimusten tutkiminen siviiliprosessissa

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http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-855-339-0
Title: Väittämistaakka, tuomarin kyselyvelvollisuus ja pakottavaan yksityisoikeudelliseen sääntelyyn perustuvien vaatimusten tutkiminen siviiliprosessissa
Author: Vaitoja, Jari
Contributor: University of Helsinki, Faculty of Law
Publisher: Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys
Date: 2014-11-07
Belongs to series: A-sarja - URN:ISSN:0356-7206
URI: http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-855-339-0
http://hdl.handle.net/10138/136314
Thesis level: Doctoral dissertation (monograph)
Abstract: The subject of this study is the various responsibilities of the parties and the court concerning the restriction and presentation of factual grounds for civil litigation claims and denials. Special focus is placed on grounds that are regulated by mandatory private law rules. The investigation of civil cases is at the initiative of the interested parties, who are obliged to invoke so called facts of law as grounds for their claims and denials. This means they must specify the factual circumstances they wish to be taken into consideration in the judgment. In addition, rules on the preclusion of the grounds for claims impose time based limitations on litigants dispositions. The party s right to present new claims or new grounds for claims may be lost if these are invoked at too late a phase during the procedure. As a result, realizing one s rights in civil procedure is highly dependent on one s financial resources or knowledge of the legal process. In order to reduce the possibility of litigants losing their rights, the judge is assigned the duty of substantive process management. A more precise goal of the study is to research how responsibility for claims based on mandatory private law is distributed between the parties and the judge. In particular, mandatory private law rules are included in labour law, consumer protection law and provisions regulating the invalidity of contracts. Similarly, there are mandatory aspects in provisions for adjustment of unfair contract terms or adjustment of compensation for damage. Substantive process management is usually considered the most important way of moderating the undesirable effects of both preclusion and the burden of allegation. The study concurs with this view but also argues that there are difficult issues connected to juridical control of the activities of the judge, as it is unclear to what degree these activities can be directed or evaluated by judicial norms. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether a party would have effective legal remedies, if any, were the judge to neglect his duties. Moreover, the precise content of the burden of allegation and the conditions under which a party could lose his right to invoke new circumstances are surprisingly wide open to interpretation. In short, the procedural provisions studied in this work are extremely flexible. While they mandate the judge to manage the process, they seem to do little to govern or restrict his use of discretion. The methodology of the study is for the most part legal dogmatic, its purpose being to systemize and interpret the procedural norms. The main questions in this area are, for example, the content of the burden of allegation, its implications for the responsibilities of the judge and litigants and neglect of substantive process management as a grounds for not precluding new claims or new grounds for claims. Equally important are the extent of the judge s responsibilities and the legal consequences of their default. The study nevertheless examines a substantial amount of legal policy and even legal theory, due to the open nature of the problems investigated. The study includes a detailed discussion of the reasons for and against the moderation of the burden of allegation on factual grounds based on mandatory rules (chapter 6). Arguments for and against the justification for material management of the case are carefully analysed in chapters 7.5 7.7. In this analysis arguments based on the rights of the litigants play a decisive role. The distinction between questions of fact and questions of law is examined in chapter 3 as the fundamental basis for the burden of allegation. Chapter 7.3 asks, within the framework of the theory of rights, whether it is reasonable to say that parties have rights in relation to a judge s responsibilities in the area of substantive process management. Chapter 7.4 deals with the question of how a judge s activities restrict or advance the freedoms of the litigants during the procedure or in their contractual relationship. The relatively passive attitude of judges is often still defended by means of an analogy with freedom of contract in private law. A discussion on the distinction between rules and principles of law is shortly introduced in chapter 2. In this study, principles of law are seen as a way to structure the relations between individual rights and collective interests. The study argues that with the help of principles of law, the individual rights of litigants should be defended against collective interests. In addition, they are seen as a way of extending juridical evaluation to areas where the authorities would otherwise have wide discretion. Chapter 3 opens with the claim that in some circumstances at least the judge should be duty bound to ensure that a party has the opportunity to invoke factual grounds even if he hasn t succeeded in doing so on his own initiative. For example, the judge may have to introduce an alternative ground into the discussion in order to give a litigant the possibility to consider invoking it. The content of the burden of allegation is also given closer examination. The study asks how a party can know which facts should be invoked and by what kind of statements this should be done in order to avoid any losses of material rights. This is quite a difficult problem, requiring answers to questions like how to distribute the burden between the parties and how to separate claims of facts, which have to be invoked, from claims of rights, for which the judge is responsible. Moreover, the burden of allegation should not concern juridical characterization of the circumstances. The latter question is especially difficult when the facts are described in legal texts using relatively abstract terms or when the relevance of the facts is based on unwritten norms. In these cases it is usually difficult to know which facts should be invoked and how exactly they should be described in the statements of the parties involved. The end of the chapter provides an analysis of the kinds of factual grounds that are investigated ex officio according to established practice or established opinion in the literature. Chapter 4 deals with the question of how to interpret the statements of the litigants. For example, should the burden of allegation be moderated by a more generous interpretation of the claims if mandatory private law seems applicable? This kind of thinking has been suggested in the civil law literature and is practised by the courts. Chapter 5 asks how a judge s neglect of different kinds of duties should be regarded as an obstacle to precluding litigants claims. In addition, the study argues that without exception preclusion requires the idea that a party has in a concrete way neglected his/her duty to invoke the facts. An examination is also provided of how to deal with factual uncertainty in circumstances involving juridical preconditions for preclusion. It is argued that an elementary distinction should be made between circumstances connected with the legal relationship of the parties on one hand and circumstances like the content of the parties statements, the questions presented by the judge, or other occurrences during court proceedings on the other hand. In chapter 6 factual grounds regulated by mandatory civil law rules are given closer examination. An analysis is provided of the justification for a judge s pronounced responsibility to ensure the investigation of these grounds and how his duties are manifested in action according to the type of grounds concerned. Chapter 7 begins by introducing some factors that hamper guidance of the judge s activities in material process management. However, the main question is the justification for the judge s responsibilities, which is analysed from the perspective of the individual rights of the parties and collective ends of society (as represented by the court). Chapter 8 examines attempts in preparatory legislative works and the literature to define the boundaries of material process management. Proposed solutions are first carefully described and then evaluated. The author s answer to the question of how the boundaries of a judge's responsibilities should be viewed is presented in chapter 9. The solution is based on constructing four main procedural principles of law with the help of procedural theory, preparatory legislative works and fundamental and human rights. These principles aim to advance realization of substantial legal protection, procedural economy, procedural justice and regulative purposes of private law. The principles are then applied in various typical situations of interpretation. Chapter 10 briefly considers the need to reform procedural legislation. The study concludes with chapter 11, where the main results of the study are summarized.Yleistajuinen tiivistelmä lähetetään jälkikäteen sähköpostitse
Subject: oikeustiede
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