Locke and Leibniz on the Balance of Reasons

Näytä kaikki kuvailutiedot



Pysyväisosoite

http://hdl.handle.net/10138/192039

Lähdeviite

Roinila , M 2013 , Locke and Leibniz on the Balance of Reasons . in S Giovanni & D Riesenfeld-Tamir (eds) , Perspectives on Theory of Controversies and the Ethics of Communication : Explorations of Marcelo Dascal's Contributions to Philosophy. . Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning , vol. 2 , Springer , Dordrecht , pp. 49-57 . https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7131-4_5

Julkaisun nimi: Locke and Leibniz on the Balance of Reasons
Tekijä: Roinila, Markku
Muu tekijä: Giovanni, Scarafile
Riesenfeld-Tamir, Dana
Tekijän organisaatio: Department of Philosophy, History and Art Studies
Julkaisija: Springer
Päiväys: 2013-11
Kieli: eng
Sivumäärä: 8
Kuuluu julkaisusarjaan: Perspectives on Theory of Controversies and the Ethics of Communication
Kuuluu julkaisusarjaan: Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning
ISBN: 978-94-007-7130-7
978-94-007-7131-4
DOI-tunniste: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7131-4_5
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/192039
Tiivistelmä: One of the features of John Locke’s moral philosophy is the idea that morality is based on our beliefs concerning the future good. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II, xxi, §70, Locke argues that we have to decide between the probability of afterlife and our present temptations. In itself, this kind of decision model is not rare in Early Modern philosophy. Blaise Pascal’s Wager is a famous example of a similar idea of balancing between available options which Marcelo Dascal has discussed in his important 2005 article “The Balance of Reason”. Leibniz, however, was not always satisfied with this kind of simple balancing. In his commentary to Locke’s Essay, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, II, xxi, §66, he presented an alternative model which is based on an idea of plural, mutually conflicting inclinations. This kind of model, called as vectorial theory of rational decision by Simo Knuuttila, fits well with Leibniz’s theory of the soul where volitions are formed as a kind of compromise between different inclinations to different goods. I will present these two models and show how they illustrate the practical rationality of Locke and Leibniz and how their moral philosophies differ, although being similar in certain respects. The topics include Leibniz’s criticism of Lockean hedonism and the discussion of akratic behaviour in II, xxi of Essay and Nouveaux essais.
Avainsanat: 611 Philosophy
John Locke
G. W. Leibniz
Moral motivation
Rational decision-making
Weakness of the will
Vertaisarvioitu: Kyllä
Tekijänoikeustiedot: cc_by
Pääsyrajoitteet: restrictedAccess
Rinnakkaistallennettu versio: submittedVersion


Tiedostot

Latausmäärä yhteensä: Ladataan...

Tiedosto(t) Koko Formaatti Näytä
Locke_and_Leibn ... sophical_Dialogue2011.docx 38.75KB Microsoft Word Avaa tiedosto

Viite kuuluu kokoelmiin:

Näytä kaikki kuvailutiedot