Locke and Leibniz on the Balance of Reasons

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dc.contributor.author Roinila, Markku
dc.contributor.editor Giovanni, Scarafile
dc.contributor.editor Riesenfeld-Tamir, Dana
dc.date.accessioned 2017-06-16T13:16:01Z
dc.date.available 2017-06-16T13:16:01Z
dc.date.issued 2013-11
dc.identifier.citation Roinila , M 2013 , Locke and Leibniz on the Balance of Reasons . in S Giovanni & D Riesenfeld-Tamir (eds) , Perspectives on Theory of Controversies and the Ethics of Communication : Explorations of Marcelo Dascal's Contributions to Philosophy. . Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning , vol. 2 , Springer , Dordrecht , pp. 49-57 . https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7131-4_5
dc.identifier.other PURE: 26434046
dc.identifier.other PURE UUID: bedba536-428b-45a1-acd3-cef6eead51c6
dc.identifier.other ORCID: /0000-0002-2456-2740/work/39203487
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10138/192039
dc.description.abstract One of the features of John Locke’s moral philosophy is the idea that morality is based on our beliefs concerning the future good. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II, xxi, §70, Locke argues that we have to decide between the probability of afterlife and our present temptations. In itself, this kind of decision model is not rare in Early Modern philosophy. Blaise Pascal’s Wager is a famous example of a similar idea of balancing between available options which Marcelo Dascal has discussed in his important 2005 article “The Balance of Reason”. Leibniz, however, was not always satisfied with this kind of simple balancing. In his commentary to Locke’s Essay, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, II, xxi, §66, he presented an alternative model which is based on an idea of plural, mutually conflicting inclinations. This kind of model, called as vectorial theory of rational decision by Simo Knuuttila, fits well with Leibniz’s theory of the soul where volitions are formed as a kind of compromise between different inclinations to different goods. I will present these two models and show how they illustrate the practical rationality of Locke and Leibniz and how their moral philosophies differ, although being similar in certain respects. The topics include Leibniz’s criticism of Lockean hedonism and the discussion of akratic behaviour in II, xxi of Essay and Nouveaux essais. en
dc.format.extent 8
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.relation.ispartof Perspectives on Theory of Controversies and the Ethics of Communication
dc.relation.ispartofseries Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning
dc.relation.isversionof 978-94-007-7130-7
dc.relation.isversionof 978-94-007-7131-4
dc.rights cc_by
dc.rights.uri info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.subject 611 Philosophy
dc.subject John Locke
dc.subject G. W. Leibniz
dc.subject Moral motivation
dc.subject Rational decision-making
dc.subject Weakness of the will
dc.title Locke and Leibniz on the Balance of Reasons en
dc.type Chapter
dc.contributor.organization Department of Philosophy, History and Art Studies
dc.description.reviewstatus Peer reviewed
dc.relation.doi https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7131-4_5
dc.rights.accesslevel restrictedAccess
dc.type.version submittedVersion

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