A micro foundation of obfuscation : time cost, strategic complexity and consumer deadlines

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dc.contributor.author Hämäläinen, Saara
dc.date.accessioned 2017-08-08T08:15:15Z
dc.date.available 2017-08-08T08:15:15Z
dc.date.issued 2017-08
dc.identifier.issn 1795-0562
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10138/208449
dc.description.abstract We consider a price search model with gradual information arrival and deadlines to study how consumers search within and across stores during a single search spell. This renders the effects of search costs smooth and allows us to endogenize the intensity of competition in a new way that avoids both Diamond and Bertrand paradoxes. Firms can commit to any choice complexity levels. They determine the relative numbers of informed and uninformed consumers, which equal in equilibrium. The outcome is thus halfway from Diamond and Bertrand equilibria. Wider price awareness and advertizing improves welfare by discouraging the prominent firm's obfuscation. en
dc.language.iso en
dc.publisher HECER – Helsinki Center of Economic Research en
dc.relation.ispartofseries HECER, Discussion Paper No. 414 en
dc.title A micro foundation of obfuscation : time cost, strategic complexity and consumer deadlines en
dc.type Working Paper en

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