Panama and the WTO : new constitutionalism of trade policy and global tax governance

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dc.contributor.author Eskelinen, Teppo
dc.contributor.author Ylonen, Matti
dc.date.accessioned 2017-12-14T12:15:00Z
dc.date.available 2017-12-14T12:15:00Z
dc.date.issued 2017
dc.identifier.citation Eskelinen , T & Ylonen , M 2017 , ' Panama and the WTO : new constitutionalism of trade policy and global tax governance ' , Review of International Political Economy , vol. 24 , no. 4 , pp. 629-656 . https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2017.1321569
dc.identifier.other PURE: 95240278
dc.identifier.other PURE UUID: 347a4d65-c9a7-4b99-84f0-07fbd15ef706
dc.identifier.other WOS: 000416537800003
dc.identifier.other Scopus: 85018337703
dc.identifier.other ORCID: /0000-0003-0024-0867/work/40746034
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10138/229602
dc.description "Corrigendum" in Review of International Political Economy, 24(4), p. 738 (DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2017.1332547).
dc.description.abstract Tax havens and tax flight have lately received increasing attention, while interest toward multilateral trade policies has somewhat diminished. We argue that more attention needs to be paid exactly to the interrelations between trade and tax policies. Drawing from two case studies on Panama's trade disputes, we show how World Trade Organization (WTO) rules can be used both to resist attempts to sanction secrecy structures and to promote measures against tax flight. The theory of new constitutionalism can help to explain how trade treaties can 'lock in' tax policies. However, our case studies show that trade policy not only 'locks in' democratic policy-making, but also enables tax havens to use their commercialized sovereignty to resists anti-secrecy measures. What is being 'locked in' are the policy tools, not necessarily the policies. The changing relationship between trade and tax policies can also create new and unexpected tools for tackling tax evasion, underlining the importance of epistemic arbitrage in the context of new constitutionalism. In principle, political actors with sufficient technical and juridical knowledge can shape global tax governance to various directions regardless of their formal position in the world political hierarchies. This should be taken into account when trade treaties are being negotiated or revised. en
dc.format.extent 28
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartof Review of International Political Economy
dc.rights cc_by_nc_nd
dc.rights.uri info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject Trade policy
dc.subject tax havens
dc.subject new constitutionalism
dc.subject Panama
dc.subject WTO
dc.subject tax policy
dc.subject EUROPEAN-UNION
dc.subject COMPETITION
dc.subject STRUGGLE
dc.subject TAXATION
dc.subject AVOIDANCE
dc.subject COERCION
dc.subject REGIME
dc.subject HAVENS
dc.subject NORMS
dc.subject 511 Economics
dc.subject 517 Political science
dc.title Panama and the WTO : new constitutionalism of trade policy and global tax governance en
dc.type Article
dc.contributor.organization Political Science
dc.contributor.organization Department of Political and Economic Studies (2010-2017)
dc.description.reviewstatus Peer reviewed
dc.relation.doi https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2017.1321569
dc.relation.issn 0969-2290
dc.rights.accesslevel openAccess
dc.type.version publishedVersion

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