Making good cider out of bad apples - Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free riders

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dc.contributor University of Helsinki, Department of Political and Economic Studies (2010-2017) en
dc.contributor University of Helsinki, Department of Economics and Management en Nagatsu, Michiru Larsen, Karen Karabegovic, Mia Székely, Marcell Mønster, Dan Michael, John 2018-03-19T08:39:02Z 2018-03-19T08:39:02Z 2018-01
dc.identifier.citation Nagatsu , M , Larsen , K , Karabegovic , M , Székely , M , Mønster , D & Michael , J 2018 , ' Making good cider out of bad apples - Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free riders ' , Judgment and decision making , vol. 13 , no. 1 , pp. 137-149 . < > en
dc.identifier.issn 1930-2975
dc.identifier.other PURE: 78877089
dc.identifier.other PURE UUID: 539fda22-2430-4288-b34d-0166dcb5976f
dc.identifier.other WOS: 000423735500011
dc.identifier.other Scopus: 85041895777
dc.identifier.other ORCID: /0000-0001-6566-0307/work/42819820
dc.description.abstract The present study investigates how group-cooperation heuristics boost voluntary contributions in a repeated public goods game. We manipulate two separate factors in a two-person public goods game: i) group composition (Selfish Subjects vs. Conditional Cooperators) and ii) common knowledge about group composition (Information vs. No Information). In addition, we let the subjects signal expectations of the other’s contributions in the experiment’s second phase. Common knowledge of Selfish type alone slightly dampens contributions but dramatically increases contributions when signaling of expectations is allowed. The results suggest that group-cooperation heuristics are triggered when two factors are jointly salient to the agent: (i) that there is no one to free-ride on; and (ii) that the other wants to cooperate because of (i). We highlight the potential effectiveness of group-cooperation heuristics and propose solution thinking as the schema of reasoning underlying the heuristics. The high correlation between expectations and actual contributions is compatible with the existence of default preference to satisfy others’ expectations (or to avoid disappointing them), but the stark end-game effect suggests that group-cooperation heuristics, at least among selfish players, function ultimately to benefit material self-interest rather than to just please others. en
dc.format.extent 13
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartof Judgment and decision making
dc.rights en
dc.subject 511 Economics en
dc.subject Experimental Economics en
dc.subject Public Goods en
dc.subject Group Identity en
dc.subject 611 Philosophy en
dc.subject Team Reasoning en
dc.subject solution thinking en
dc.title Making good cider out of bad apples - Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free riders en
dc.type Article
dc.description.version Peer reviewed
dc.type.uri info:eu-repo/semantics/other
dc.type.uri info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

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