Russell on Negative Judgment

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Korhonen , A 2020 , ' Russell on Negative Judgment ' , Topoi , vol. 39 , no. 3 , pp. 727-742 .

Title: Russell on Negative Judgment
Author: Korhonen, Anssi
Contributor organization: Department of Philosophy, History and Art Studies
Date: 2020-07
Language: eng
Number of pages: 16
Belongs to series: Topoi
ISSN: 0167-7411
Abstract: This paper concerns Bertrand Russell’s changing views on negative judgement. ‘Negative judgement’ is considered in the context of three theories of judgement that Russell put forth at different times: (i) a dual relation theory (judgement involves a two-place relation between a subject and a proposition, which is an objective truth or falsehood); (ii) a multiple relation theory (judging relates a subject to a multiplicity of objects); (iii) a psychological theory of judgement (judgment involves a mental content standing in a relation of objective reference to its truth- or false-maker). Four issues are singled out for a more detailed discussion: (i) quality dualism versus quality monism, that is, the question whether judgement comes in two kinds, acceptance and rejection, or whether there is only one judgement-quality (acceptance/assertion); (ii) the structure of negative judging; (iii) the problem of truth-making for negative facts; (iv) the different roles of ‘fact’ in Russell’s theories of truth. What emerges from the discussion is a rough chronology of Russell’s views on negative judgement during the period from 1903 to 1948.
Subject: 611 Philosophy
Peer reviewed: Yes
Rights: unspecified
Usage restriction: openAccess
Self-archived version: acceptedVersion

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