Emission permit trading with a self-interested regulator
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Palokangas , T K 2019 , ' Emission permit trading with a self-interested regulator ' , Environmental Economics and Policy Studies , vol. 21 , no. 3 , pp. 413–426 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-019-00236-8
| Title: | Emission permit trading with a self-interested regulator |
| Author: | Palokangas, Tapio Kalervo |
| Contributor: | University of Helsinki, HECER |
| Date: | 2019-07 |
| Language: | eng |
| Number of pages: | 14 |
| Belongs to series: | Environmental Economics and Policy Studies |
| ISSN: | 1432-847X |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10138/305014 |
| Abstract: | I examine the welfare effects of emission permit trading in an economy where the use of energy in production generates welfare-harming emissions, there is a regulator that sets industry-specific emission permits and the industries influence the regulator by paying political contributions. I show that policy with nontraded emission permits establishes aggregate production efficiency. Emission permit trading hampers efficiency and welfare by increasing the use of emitting inputs in dirty and decreasing that in clean industries. |
| Subject: |
1172 Environmental sciences
511 Economics Emission caps Emission permit trading Command-and-control instruments Common agency games Pollution Externalities Policy |
| Rights: |
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