Knowing Without Having The Competence to Do So

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http://hdl.handle.net/10138/307502

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Hirvelä , J 2019 , ' Knowing Without Having The Competence to Do So ' , Thought: A Journal of Philosophy , vol. 8 , no. 2 , pp. 110-118 . https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.411

Title: Knowing Without Having The Competence to Do So
Author: Hirvelä, Jaakko
Contributor: University of Helsinki, Theoretical Philosophy
Date: 2019-06
Language: eng
Number of pages: 9
Belongs to series: Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
ISSN: 2161-2234
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/307502
Abstract: According to all varieties of virtue reliabilism, knowledge is always gained through the exercise of epistemic competences. These competences can be conceived as competences to form true beliefs, or as competences to know. I will present a short but decisive argument against the idea that knowledge is always gained through the exercise of competences to know. The competence to know isn't necessary for gaining knowledge.
Subject: virtue epistemology
competence
Lisa Miracchi
Christoph Kelp
knowledge-first epistemology
611 Philosophy
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