International fisheries agreements and non-consumptive values

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Pintassilgo , P , Laukkanen , M , Gronbaek , L & Lindroos , M 2018 , ' International fisheries agreements and non-consumptive values ' , Fisheries Research , vol. 203 , pp. 46-54 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2017.07.004

Title: International fisheries agreements and non-consumptive values
Author: Pintassilgo, Pedro; Laukkanen, Marita; Gronbaek, Lone; Lindroos, Marko
Contributor: University of Helsinki, Department of Economics and Management
Date: 2018-07
Language: eng
Number of pages: 9
Belongs to series: Fisheries Research
ISSN: 0165-7836
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/313340
Abstract: The management of internationally shared fish stocks is a major economic, environmental and political issue. According to international law, these resources should be managed cooperatively under international fisheries agreements (IFAs). This paper studies the formation and stability of IFAs through a coalition game that accounts for both direct consumptive values (harvesting profits) and non-consumptive values of the fish stock per se. The results show that accounting for non-consumptive values helps conserve the fish stock in that equilibrium fishing efforts are smaller and fish stock larger than without non-consumptive values under all possible coalition scenarios (full, partial and no cooperation). However, considering non-consumptive values does not affect the outcome of the game in terms of the prospects for cooperation: even with substantial non-consumptive benefits, the outcome is full non-cooperation. Hence, the trap of non-cooperation in international fisheries management cannot be overcome simply by explicitly accounting for non-consumptive values within IFAs. It is suggested that strengthening the role of IFAs and limiting the ability of non-member countries to free-ride be further investigated as measures fostering cooperation.
Subject: Coalition games
International fisheries agreements
Non-consumptive values
Non-use values
Shared fish stocks
STRADDLING STOCK FISHERIES
GREAT FISH WAR
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
RENEWABLE RESOURCES
OPTIMAL MANAGEMENT
HIGH SEAS
VALUATION
COOPERATION
STABILITY
MODEL
511 Economics
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