Preference-Based Privacy Markets

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http://hdl.handle.net/10138/321144

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Pal , R , Crowcroft , J , Wang , Y , Li , Y , De , S , Tarkoma , S , Liu , M , Nag , B , Kumar , A & Hui , P 2020 , ' Preference-Based Privacy Markets ' , IEEE Access , vol. 8 , pp. 146006-146026 . https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3014882

Title: Preference-Based Privacy Markets
Author: Pal, Ranjan; Crowcroft, Jon; Wang, Yixuan; Li, Yong; De, Swades; Tarkoma, Sasu; Liu, Mingyan; Nag, Bodhibrata; Kumar, Abhishek; Hui, Pan
Contributor: University of Helsinki, Department of Computer Science
University of Helsinki, Department of Computer Science
University of Helsinki, Department of Computer Science
Date: 2020
Language: eng
Number of pages: 21
Belongs to series: IEEE Access
ISSN: 2169-3536
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/321144
Abstract: In the modern era of the mobile apps (the era of surveillance capitalism - as termed by Shoshana Zuboff) huge quantities of surveillance data about consumers and their activities offer a wave of opportunities for economic and societal value creation. ln-app advertising - a multi-billion dollar industry, is an essential part of the current digital ecosystem driven by free mobile applications, where the ecosystem entities usually comprise consumer apps, their clients (consumers), ad-networks, and advertisers. Sensitive consumer information is often being sold downstream in this ecosystem without the knowledge of consumers, and in many cases to their annoyance. While this practice, in cases, may result in long-term benefits for the consumers, it can result in serious information privacy breaches of very significant impact (e.g., breach of genetic data) in the short term. The question we raise through this paper is: Is it economically feasible to trade consumer personal information with their formal consent (permission) and in return provide them incentives (monetary or otherwise)?. In view of (a) the behavioral assumption that humans are 'compromising' beings and have privacy preferences, (b) privacy as a good not having strict boundaries, and (c) the practical inevitability of inappropriate data leakage by data holders downstream in the data-release supply-chain, we propose a design of regulated efficient/bounded inefficient economic mechanisms for oligopoly data trading markets using a novel preference function bidding approach on a simplified sellers-broker market. Our methodology preserves the heterogeneous privacy preservation constraints (at a grouped consumer, i.e., app, level) upto certain compromise levels, and at the same time satisfies information demand (via the broker) of agencies (e.g., advertising organizations) that collect client data for the purpose of targeted behavioral advertising.
Subject: Data privacy
Privacy
Ecosystems
Economics
Advertising
Electronic mail
Surveillance
Information privacy
preference
supply function economics
trading
market equilibrium
113 Computer and information sciences
512 Business and Management
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