From Neuroscience to Law : Bridging the Gap

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dc.contributor University of Helsinki, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies en Pernu, Tuomas K. Elzein, Nadine 2020-11-06T13:18:02Z 2020-11-06T13:18:02Z 2020-10-22
dc.identifier.citation Pernu , T K & Elzein , N 2020 , ' From Neuroscience to Law : Bridging the Gap ' , Frontiers in Psychology , vol. 11 , 1862 . en
dc.identifier.issn 1664-1078
dc.identifier.other PURE: 150356310
dc.identifier.other PURE UUID: a3cb9505-06ea-41c9-8a5d-ac2c3d8783db
dc.identifier.other RIS: urn:2D9AB2CEB6BF52F399A8454D1A6150EA
dc.description.abstract Since our moral and legal judgments are focused on our decisions and actions, one would expect information about the neural underpinnings of human decision-making and action-production to have a significant bearing on those judgments. However, despite the wealth of empirical data, and the public attention it has attracted in the past few decades, the results of neuroscientific research have had relatively little influence on legal practice. It is here argued that this is due, at least partly, to the discussion on the relationship of the neurosciences and law mixing up a number of separate issues that have different relevance on our moral and legal judgments. The approach here is hierarchical; more and less feasible ways in which neuroscientific data could inform such judgments are separated from each other. The neurosciences and other physical views on human behavior and decision-making do have the potential to have an impact on our legal reasoning. However, this happens in various different ways, and too often appeal to any neural data is assumed to be automatically relevant to shaping our moral and legal judgments. Our physicalist intuitions easily favor neural-level explanations to mental-level ones. But even if you were to subscribe to some reductionist variant of physicalism, it would not follow that all neural data should be automatically relevant to our moral and legal reasoning. However, the neurosciences can give us indirect evidence for reductive physicalism, which can then lead us to challenge the very idea of free will. Such a development can, ultimately, also have repercussions on law and legal practice. en
dc.format.extent 23
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartof Frontiers in Psychology
dc.rights en
dc.subject 515 Psychology en
dc.subject agency en
dc.subject causation en
dc.subject culpability en
dc.subject free will en
dc.subject liability en
dc.subject methodological dualism en
dc.subject neurolaw en
dc.subject prefrontal cortex en
dc.title From Neuroscience to Law : Bridging the Gap en
dc.type Article
dc.description.version Peer reviewed
dc.type.uri info:eu-repo/semantics/other
dc.type.uri info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

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