Strong Emergence and Alexander's Dictum

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Carruth , A 2019 , Strong Emergence and Alexander's Dictum . in S Gibb , R F Hendry & T Lancaster (eds) , The Routledge Handbook of Emergence . Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy , Routledge , Abingdon and New York , pp. 87-98 .

Title: Strong Emergence and Alexander's Dictum
Author: Carruth, Alex
Other contributor: University of Helsinki, Department of Philosophy, History and Art Studies
Gibb, Sophie
Hendry, Robin Findlay
Lancaster, Tom
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 2019
Language: eng
Number of pages: 12
Belongs to series: The Routledge Handbook of Emergence
Belongs to series: Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy
ISBN: 978-1-128-92508-3
Abstract: This chapter offers some clarification on how the principle ought to be interpreted–presenting causal criteria in the sloganistic manner is somewhat commonplace. It examines the role AD plays in the debate between emergentists and reductionists, the motivations for endorsing AD and some criticisms which AD faces, some responses to these criticisms. The chapter explores some wider consequences of giving causal powers a central role in the debate between emergentists and reductionists. S. Alexander’s dictum provides an attractive standard by which to assess putative cases of reduction or emergence. A consequence of the adoption of Alexander’s dictum has been outlined: parties to the debate may need to engage explicitly with questions concerning the nature of powers in order to avoid prejudicing the debate or talking past one another. There are a number of compelling reasons to adopt AD within the emergence debate, and thus to frame strong metaphysical emergence in terms of the possession of distinct, novel causal powers.
Subject: 611 Philosophy
Philosophy of Science

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